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Introduction
Why does sexual harassment persist despite nearly three decades of
attempts to eliminate it? While courts have developed a comprehensive
set of legal rules governing workplace harassment, the incidence of har-
assment has not changed. That is true, in part, because the rules of em-
ployer liability for harassment are calculated to ensure that employers adopt
basic policies and procedures with respect to workplace harassment, not,
surprisingly, to ensure that they actually prevent it.
There is little evidence in the vast social science literature to support
this emphasis on rule compliance. In fact, cookie-cutter sexual harassment
policies and procedures do not seem to have any reliably negative effect
on the incidence of harassment. Yet, Justice Kennedy declared in Bur-
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth that the very purpose of Title VII is "to
encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and effective grievance
mechanisms,"' signaling a victory for a misguided culture of compliance,
one in which liability is measured not by whether employers successfully
prevent harassment, but instead by whether they comply with judicially
created prophylactic rules. In this regime, employers could conceivably
insulate themselves from liability entirely without making a dent in the
underlying problem. That this possibility represents a flaw in the legal
system should be obvious.
' Associate Professor, Hofstra Law School. B.A., Amherst College; J.D., Stanford Law
School. My thanks to Grant Hayden for his editing and Cindy Furuno, Allison Maue, and
Jennifer Sharf for their excellent research assistance. An earlier version of this Article was
presented at the 2002 Conference of the Association for the Study of Law, Culture, and the
Humanities and at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association. I thank
participants at both conferences for their thoughtful questions and comments.
'524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). Justice O'Connor echoed this approach the following year
in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n. 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999), declaring that law encour-
ages employers "to adopt antidiscrimination policies and to educate their personnel on
Title Vll's prohibitions." Theresa Beiner has criticized courts for making voluntary com-
pliance with prophylactic rules a central rather than collateral purpose of Title VII. See
generally Theresa M. Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge: The Implications of
Social Science Research on Imputing Liability to Employers for Sexual Harassment, 7 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 273 (2001) [hereinafter Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowl-
edge] (reviewing literature on the training effect and victim response to harassment).
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The law governing employer liability for sexual harassment was re-
configured in 1998 by the Supreme Court's opinions in Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton and Ellerth,2 which together created a new legal regime
composed of seemingly bright line rules for employers and victims of
sexual harassment.' The centerpiece of the liability scheme is a rule of
automatic liability for hostile environment harassment by supervisors,
softened by an affirmative defense that excuses employers from liability
or damages if they take adequate preventative and corrective measures.'
The rules themselves continue to be developed and refined as lower courts
struggle to apply them, and academic commentators continue to offer
doctrinal praise and criticism.' Meanwhile, outside courtrooms and law
reviews, lawyers, consultants, and human resource professionals have
formulated and disseminated advice to employers about responding and
conforming to the new legal regime. Employers have taken their advice,
by and large, adopting or updating procedures and training programs and
implementing internal grievance procedures.
But do these measures actually work? Not necessarily, and certainly
not as well or as automatically as many apparently believe. This fact has
been virtually overlooked in both legal and extralegal discourse, in which
little or no attempt has been made to connect the legal regime to the ac-
tual problem of harassment. Rules are developed and incentives are cre-
ated with little or no attention paid to whether these legally mandated
employer interventions are likely to prevent harassment or adequately
redress the harm it creates when prevention fails.
This Article remedies this inattention by reevaluating the legal re-
gime in light of an emerging body of social science literature addressing
the causes of harassment, the effectiveness of various preventative meas-
ures, and the substantive and procedural adequacy of internal grievance
procedures. The reevaluation demonstrates that the legal regime has
overemphasized compliance with prophylactic rules at the expense of
effecting real change in preventing the problem of sexual harassment in
the workplace. Employers who play a significant role in maintaining a
work environment that is either hostile or hospitable to sexual harassment
are rewarded for paying lip service to the regime by enacting standard-
2 See Faragher, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742. In Kolstad v. American
Dental Ass'n, the Court supplemented the rules in Faragher and Ellerth by deciding that
punitive damages could not be imposed against employers who have made good-faith ef-
forts to comply with Title VII. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545.
1 The rules of liability have been applied with equal force to harassment based on any
prohibited characteristic, including race, national origin, color, religion, and sex. See, e.g.,
Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 180) F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that Faragher and Ellerth standards apply to racial harassment).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Har-
assment, 61 U. PITT. L. REv. 671 (2000) (criticizing the Supreme Court's and lower courts'
interpretation of Title VII as too lenient with regard to employer liability and doctrinally
inconsistent).
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issue policies and procedures, regardless of whether those efforts actually
reduce harassment or compensate victims. Thus, the triumph of form over
substance in sexual harassment law occurs.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly describes the con-
tinuing problem of sexual harassment and summarizes case law relating
to employer liability for sexual harassment. It then describes the incen-
tives the law creates for employers, victims, and harassers, and explains
how each group responds to these incentives.
Part II explores whether the preventative measures spurred by the le-
gal regime serve Title VII's goal of deterring harassment and preventing
harm. It first identifies individual and organizational factors that cause or
correlate with the level of harassment in order to develop theoretical con-
nections between employer preventative measures and the underlying prob-
lem of harassment. It then explores empirical studies and surveys ana-
lyzing the efficacy of particular, testable measures to determine whether
they are useful in combating harassment. Part III explores whether cor-
rective measures induced by the legal rules adequately serve Title VII's
companion goal of compensating victims for acts of discrimination.
The Article concludes with some suggestions for reform, designed to
refocus legal rules and workplace norms around successful prevention of
harassment and compensation of victims as opposed to simple, blind rule
compliance. Specifically, it recommends that the affirmative defense pres-
ently adopted by the courts be abolished by Congress, resulting in a stan-
dard of pure automatic liability. Short of that, it suggests that punitive dam-
ages should be available regardless of an employer's good-faith efforts to
prevent harassment, if, in fact, egregious harassment occurs on its watch.
The Article also suggests that Title VII should be amended to permit indi-
vidual supervisory liability for harassment. Taken together, these changes
might give employers the incentive to aim higher than mere compliance and
towards success. In addition, it suggests some non-doctrinal efforts that may
also contribute to the reduction or elimination of workplace harassment.
I. THE NEW REGIME
A. The Problem of Harassment
That sexual harassment continues to plague the American workforce is
beyond dispute. In survey after survey, many workers-mostly women-
continue to report relatively high rates of harassment. In the first major
systematic workplace study, conducted by the United States Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board (USMSPB) and published in 1981, four in ten fe-
male respondents reported experiencing at least one incident of harass-
ment in the two years prior to the survey.6 Subsequent studies have revealed
'U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: Is
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similar or even higher rates of harassment. Studies estimate that Fortune
500 companies each lose $6.7 million annually due to costs associated with
sexual harassment.8
Most sexual harassment victims are women; most perpetrators are men.9
Verbal conduct such as jokes, sexual remarks, and sexual teasing are most
commonly reported, followed by sexual touching." Demands or pressure for
sexual favors constitute only a small percentage of complaints.' A majority
of complaints involve co-worker, rather than supervisory, harassment. 12
While survey results suggest that the level of harassment has stag-
nated for more than twenty years, harassment-related lawsuits and ad-
ministrative charges have risen dramatically during the same period. The
number of administrative complaints of harassment filed with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) continues to grow both in
IT A PROBLEM? 36 (1981) [hereinafter USMSPB 19811.
I See generally U.S. MERIT SYs. PROT. BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
WORKPLACE: AN UPDATE (1988) [hereinafter USMSPB 1988]; U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD.,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND CONTINUING
CHALLENGES 13 (1995) [hereinafter USMSPB 1995] (updating surveys from 1981 and
1988); see also AMY L. CULBERTSON ET AL., ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
NAVY: RESULTS OF THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 10 (1992) (finding, based on Navy sur-
vey, that forty-two percent of enlisted women and twenty-six percent of female officers
reported being sexually harassed during a one-year survey period); Grossman, supra note
5, at 673; see also infra text accompanying notes 9-13 (reviewing survey results).
I Gerald L. Blakely et al., The Effects of Training on Perceptions of Sexual Harassment
Allegations, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 71, 72 (1998) (citing R. Sandroff, Sexual Har-
assment in the Fortune 500, 13 WORKING WOMAN 69 (1988)).
9One survey found that 81% of complaints involve female complainants and male
perpetrators, 9% the opposite, and 10% involve same-sex harassment. See SOC'Y FOR HU-
MAN RES. MGMT., SEXUAL HARASSMENT SURVEY 5 (1999) [hereinafter SHRM SURVEY]. The
percentage of federal administrative charges involving female complainants reflects a similar
pattern: 86% of the charges filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) in 2001 involved female complainants (down from 90% in 1992). See EEOC, SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT CHARGES EEOC AND FEPAs COMBINED: FY 1992-2001, [hereinafter
EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS], at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last modified Feb. 6,
2003); see also Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 548, 560 (2001) (finding, based on analysis of all published sexual har-
assment cases between 1986 and 1995, that only 5.4% of lawsuits were brought by men).
"'See USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 16; SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 6; CUL-
BERTSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 10.
" See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 6 (seven percent); USMSPB 1995, supra note
7, at 16 (two percent); see also Juliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 565 (finding, based on a
study of published sexual harassment opinions, that quid pro quo claims are significantly
less common than hostile environment claims).
'
2 See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 5 (reporting that 51% of complaints involve co-
workers, while only 24% involve supervisors); USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 18 (finding
that victims were harassed by co-workers more than twice as often as they were harassed
by supervisors). A study of published sexual harassment cases found that a greater propor-
tion of claims involved supervisory rather than co-worker harassment. See Juliano &
Schwab, supra note 9, at 564 (finding that 59% of cases between 1986 and 1995 named
only supervisors as the harasser, and an additional 20% named supervisors and co-workers).
This surprising result almost certainly reflects a selection bias by plaintiffs, who are more
likely to believe (probably correctly) that claims against supervisors will be successful.
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absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total complaints processed. 3
Internal reports of harassment have increased somewhat, although they still
remain low compared to the rates of harassment reported in surveys."
B. The Basic Legal Regime
In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 5 the Su-
preme Court recognized that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimi-
nation prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 The Court
left open the question of employer liability, however, stating only that a
rule of automatic liability was too harsh for employers while a rule re-
quiring actual notice to the employer as a precondition to liability was too
harsh for victims. 7 The Court instead directed lower courts to examine
agency principles to analyze whether and when employers could be held
liable under Title VII for sexual harassment in the workplace. 8 Lower
courts struggled with this mandate, disagreeing about how much weight
to give an employer's sexual harassment policy in determining liability' 9
and whether to penalize plaintiffs who failed to make use of available
policies and grievance procedures.2 °
11 The number of administrative sexual harassment charges filed rose from 10,532 in
1992 to 15,836 in 2000, a 50% percent increase, as compared to a 3.2% increase in overall
charges filed during the same period, from 77,444 to 79,896. See EEOC CHARGE STATIS-
TICS, supra note 9. The monetary payouts secured solely through EEOC proceedings,
rather than litigation, rose from $12.7 million to $54.6 million during the same period. Id.
"4 See infra text accompanying notes 126-130.
15477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16 Title VII provides, in relevant part:
[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any in-
dividual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994). The protection against sexual harassment is drawn from
the language about discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment. See, e.g.,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
'7 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII, under which the term "employer" is
defined to include "agents," to require this analysis. Id. (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(1994)); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
'1 Compare Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997) (not-
ing the importance of an employer's sexual harassment policy when determining liability),
with Kracunas v. Iona Coll., 119 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that the existence of a
sexual harassment policy with reasonable complaint procedures does not insulate an em-
ployer from liability).
20 Compare Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1101, 1118 (N.D. 111. 1996)
(holding that the "failure to utilize the equal employment opportunity procedures" was
grounds for granting summary judgment to the employer), and Ridley v. D.C., 945 F. Supp.
333, 340 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding plaintiff's failure to complain to be "fatal"), with Salazer
v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., No. V-84-28, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6349, at *3 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 22, 1989) (plaintiff's failure to invoke procedure does not "automatically insu-
late the employer from liability").
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The Supreme Court addressed these issues directly in 1998, issuing
two important opinions concerning employer liability. In Faragher and
Ellerth, the Court jointly held that for supervisory harassment culminat-
ing in a tangible employment action, employers are automatically liable. 2'
But for supervisory harassment without such a consequence, employers
may assert a two-prong affirmative defense, which operates as a bar to
liability or damages.
22
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending em-
ployer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages,
subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense
comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually har-
assing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasona-
bly failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective oppor-
tunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
2 3
The Court in these cases also approved the lower court consensus that
claims involving co-worker rather than supervisory harassment should be
governed by a negligence standard, holding employers liable only when
they knew or should have known of the harassment, but failed to take
prompt and effective remedial action.2 4
The affirmative defense, which carves out an exception to a general
rule of automatic liability, shapes employers' conduct. This Section ex-
plores the messages given to employers, the means through which those
messages are transmitted, and the likely responses of the recipients.
2' See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
A tangible employment action is one that constitutes "a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different re-
sponsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
22 Whether an employer who makes out the affirmative defense escapes liability alto-
gether or simply avoids paying damages is a matter of dispute. I have argued in an earlier
piece that the affirmative defense should not operate to bar liability, but only to reduce
damages. See Grossman, supra note 5, at 704-09. Some courts, however, have construed
the defense quite broadly as a complete defense to liability. See id. at 709 (describing im-
plementation of affirmative defense by lower federal courts).
21 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Several courts have quite inex-
plicably eliminated the second prong of the affirmative defense entirely. See Grossman,
supra note 5, at 711 (describing cases following such an approach); see also Jaudon v.
Elder Health, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 2d 153, 164 (D. Md. 2000) (holding that the employer
need not prove the second prong of the affirmative defense when the first prong is sa-
tisfied); Brown v. Henderson, 155 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (same).
24 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799 (noting that lower courts have "uniformly judg[ed]
employer liability for co-worker harassment under a negligence standard"); see supra note
23 (collecting cases); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (d) (2002).
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C. Employers. Incentives, Communication, and Responses
1. Employer Incentives
The advice employers receive is the product of the Faragher and
Ellerth opinions, as well as the considerable body of law already devel-
oped in their wake. The law-transmitted to employers through the mecha-
nisms described below-creates some basic incentives for employers.25
These incentives fall into two categories: measures to prevent harassment
and measures to remedy harassment once it occurs.
a. Prevention
The incentive for employers to prevent harassment comes from two
legal rules. First, employers are automatically held liable when, as a re-
sult of harassment, a tangible employment action is taken against the
victim-employee.26 Sometimes referred to as quid pro quo,27 this type of
harassment typically involves a supervisor who takes adverse action against
an employee who refuses to submit to sexual advances. Although there are
no defenses to this type of harassment for employers, the rules create certain
incentives for them nonetheless.
Employers who face automatic liability for this kind of supervisory
conduct have the incentive to be more discriminate in hiring supervisors,
to train them more effectively, and to monitor their behavior more closely
during employment. The fact that the employer has the power to take these
prophylactic steps contributed to the Court's decision to impose liability
upon them for failing to do so.28
Although these incentives are targeted indirectly at harassers-to prevent or deter
them from harassing-the absence of individual liability under Title VII means that har-
assers have little reason to react to the legal regime itself. Every federal court of appeals to
consider the issue has concluded that Title VII does not permit individual liability against
harassing supervisors. See, e.g., Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1995);
Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-17 (2d Cir. 1995); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d
994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995). Some states, however, do permit individual liability under their
own anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Genaro v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 703 N.E.2d 782, 787-88
(Ohio 1999). A partial remedy for the problems identified in this Article is to change this
approach and establish individual liability for supervisory harassers. See infra text accom-
panying notes 438-439.
26 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
27 The Supreme Court insisted in Faragher and Ellerth that quid pro quo did not create
a legally significant category, but then recreated an essentially identical category under a
new name-harassment resulting in a tangible employment action. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753.
21 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 803:
Recognition of employer liability when discriminatory misuse of supervisory
authority alters the terms and conditions of a victim's employment is underscored
by the fact that the employer has a greater opportunity to guard against miscon-
duct by supervisors than by common workers; employers have greater opportunity
and incentive to screen them, train them, and monitor their performance.
2003]
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Second, employers have an incentive to take preventative measures
because of the affirmative defense available in hostile environment cases,
29
the first prong of which requires employers to take "reasonable care" to
"prevent ... any sexually harassing behavior."30 This incentive was rein-
forced by a ruling from the Supreme Court the year following Faragher
and Ellerth in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n,3" which held that an
employer may not be forced to pay punitive damages for supervisory har-
assment when the conduct is contrary to the employer's good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII. Employers who insure against sexual harassment
claims have an additional incentive,3 2 since many insurers require policy-
holders to take certain prophylactic measures as a condition of coverage."
The duty to prevent harassment has been interpreted by lower courts
to include three possible elements: formal policies, anti-harassment training,
and miscellaneous preventative measures.
Of course, employers have the incentive to take these measures to avoid all forms of har-
assment, not just quid pro quo. The affirmative defense may further contribute to the in-
centive to screen and monitor supervisors. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235
F.3d 713, 736 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant could not make out the affirmative
defense, in part, because it "made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors")
(citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808).
19 "Hostile environment" describes harassment consisting of verbal, physical, or environ-
mental behavior that is sexual in nature and has the effect of creating a hostile, offensive,
or abusive working environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
3" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
31 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999). Justice O'Connor specifically acknowledged anti-harassment
policies and programs as the type of good-faith efforts courts should consider in deciding
whether to spare an employer from punitive damages. See id.
32 See Tony Attrino, CFOs Urged to Learn Costs of Bias Cases, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
PROP. & CASUALTY, Oct. 26, 1998 (discussing growth in demand for Employment Practices
Liability Insurance (EPLI)); Kearney W. Kilens, Assessing EPLI Coverage: Helpful Ques-
tions for Potential Insureds, 24 EMP. REL. L.J. 101, 102 (1998) (finding that EPLI is read-
ily available, even for intentional violations). Just a few years ago, the only specific insur-
ance an employer could buy in this area was a sexual harassment defense policy, which
covered the costs of defending against a harassment lawsuit but not damages that might be
awarded to the victim. See Martha Sweeney Kulak, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
Claim Perspective and Interpretation, C.P.C.U. J. 227, 232 (Dec. 1992). Sexual harassment
claims are probably excluded from most employers' general liability policies, either be-
cause they do not meet the definition of bodily injury or because an exclusion for inten-
tional acts may apply. See id. Victim compensation may be available, however, under the
employer's liability section of a worker's compensation policy. See id.; see also Schmidt v.
Smith, 713 A.2d 1014, 1017-18 (N.J. 1998) (allowing claim under workers' compensa-
tion). But see Ottumwa Hous. Auth. v. State Farm and Casualty Co., 495 N.W.2d 723, 730
(Iowa 1993) (rejecting claim filed under workers' compensation).
" See, e.g., John D. Canoni, Sexual Harassment: The New Liability, 46 RISK MGMT. 12
(1999) ("EPLI will become more popular-even applying for such insurance is helpful
because carriers will not cover a company unless its employment policies and procedures
are in order.").
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i. Formal Policies
Although the Supreme Court stopped short in Faragher and Ellerth
of absolutely requiring employers to enact formal, written anti-harassment
policies, it came very close.
While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every in-
stance as a matter of law, the need for a stated policy suitable to
the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed
in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.34
Courts have been strict with employers who do not meet this basic re-
quirement of having a policy specifically dealing with sexual harassment,35
but have been flexible in approving different types of policies.3 6
Courts differ on the necessary elements of a legally sufficient policy,
but most require the following: (i) a description of prohibited conduct;37
(ii) a list of individuals to whom complaints should be made,38 with a bypass
procedure to ensure that no victim will have to complain to her harasser;39
and (iii) a grievance procedure calculated to bring out complaints. Addi-
tional elements may weigh in an employer's favor.40 Separate clauses prom-
" Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The EEOC has taken the position that small businesses
may be able to satisfy this prong of the affirmative defense without a formal, written policy
as long as they have informal mechanisms in place for preventing harassment. See EEOC,
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR SMALL EMPLOYERS ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR HARASS-
MENT BY SUPERVISORS, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/harassment-facts.html (last modified June
21, 1999), at Question 7 ("Small businesses may be able to discharge their ability to pre-
vent and correct harassment through less formal means.").
35 See, e.g., Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that the employer
could not prevail on the affirmative defense as a matter of law because it maintained only a
general anti-discrimination policy, which made no specific mention of sexual harassment).
"I See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297-99 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(approving store's policy even though only one in-store person was designated to receive com-
plaints, because employees had knowledge of and access to other designees in the district).
17 See, e.g., Thomas v. BET Soundstage Rest., 104 F Supp. 2d 558, 565 (D. Md. 2000)
(holding employers' policy inadequate because it did not define harassment or give any exam-
ples).
1 See, e.g., Gentry v. Exp. Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 842, 847-48 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding employer's policy inadequate because it designated the "Human Resources Repre-
sentative" to receive complaints, but did not specify who filled the position).
31 See, e.g., O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 736 (1st Cir. 2001) (denying
employer's claim to the affirmative defense in part because the policy did not include any
assurance that the harasser could be bypassed in registering or processing complaints). The
failure to include a bypass procedure was one factor in the Supreme Court's decision that
the defendant in Faragher could not prevail on the affirmative defense. See Faragher, 524
U.S. at 808.
4
"'See, e.g., Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) (praising
employer's policy because it defined sexual harassment, designated a list of employees to
receive complaints and included a bypass procedure, described the potential disciplinary
measures, and stated that retaliation would not be tolerated).
2003]
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ising confidentiality and prohibiting retaliation are examples of clauses
that support an employer's claim of reasonable preventative efforts.4"
Whether an employer's anti-harassment policy has been sufficiently
disseminated to the workforce has turned out to be an important factor in
cases considering the affirmative defense. Faragher set the stage for this
development when it deprived the employer of the opportunity to prove
the affirmative defense, in part because it "had entirely failed to dissemi-
nate its [sexual harassment] policy among [its] ... employees. 4 2 While
courts have continued to punish employers who fail to disseminate or
make available their anti-harassment policies,43 they have also meted out
significant rewards to employers who keep their employees on notice of
their policies and procedures.' At least one circuit has held that distribu-
tion of an adequate policy provides "compelling proof" of adequate pre-
vention, which can only be rebutted with evidence that the "employer
adopted or administered [it] in bad faith or that the policy was otherwise
defective or dysfunctional."4 5 Other courts have imposed a slightly more
rigorous standard, requiring that employers maintain policies that are
"reasonably designed and reasonably effectual."46
1 See, e.g., Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding of adequate prevention based in part on the policy's promises that complaints
would "be kept as confidential as possible" and that no employee would "be penalized in
any way for reporting a harassment problem"); Thomas, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 565 (noting that
otherwise inadequate policy also lacked provisions on retaliation and confidentiality). But
cf. Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding policy that does
not promise confidentiality was nonetheless sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the
affirmative defense).
42 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808.4
1See Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1027 (10th Cir. 2001) (denying
employer's motion for judgment as matter of law because "the evidence indicates that non-
supervisory personnel were not provided with copies of the policy, nor were copies of the
policy posted on all the bulletin boards in the mine"); Frederick v. Sprint/United Mgmt.
Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1314 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (holding that employer is "required to show that
its sexual harassment policy was effectively published"); Wilburn v. Fleet Fin. Group, Inc.,
170 F. Supp. 2d 219, 229-30 (D. Conn. 2001) (finding prevention inadequate when em-
ployer neither distributed policy nor provided training that the policy mandated).
44See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding
grant of summary judgment to the employer, in part because the employer made the policy
available in "public access" places where the employees could read it, even though the
employer never distributed it to each employee).
45 Barrett, 240 F.3d at 266; see also Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 811 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a company's distribution of an appropriate policy often satisfies
the first prong of the affirmative defense).
46 Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 822, 827 (W.D.N.C. 2000); see also
Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1268 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (de-
nying employer the first prong of the affirmative defense because policy was not compre-
hensive, well-known, or vigorously enforced); Reed v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,
Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1068 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (inquiring not only about the existence
of an anti-harassment policy, but also whether it is being implemented and is reasonably
effective).
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ii. Training and Other Prevention Efforts
Although distribution of an appropriate anti-harassment policy may
be sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense, employ-
ers have nonetheless been advised to undertake additional prevention ef-
forts to better insulate themselves from liability. Training is one example.
Faragher and Ellerth were widely interpreted by employment advisors
and commentators to make employee and supervisor training important,
if not required.47 Courts weigh anti-harassment training as a factor in evalu-
ating an employer's preventative efforts,48 but none has made it an abso-
lute requirement for establishing the affirmative defense.49 Employers may
have other incentives to offer training, including but not limited to state
law that sometimes requires it.50
Employers have also undertaken more creative prevention efforts,
such as monitoring employee e-mail for certain types of language or im-
ages,5 or providing individualized training programs. 2 These efforts, while
" See, e.g., Peter Aronson, Justices' Sex Harassment Decisions Spark Fears: Compa-
nies Review Policies to Avoid 'Ellerth' Liability, 21 NAT'L L.J. (Nov. 9, 1998), at Al (re-
porting that companies offering sexual harassment training cannot keep up with the de-
mand after the Faragher and Ellerth decisions); Harriet Johnson Brackey, Everyone Knows
What Harassment Is-Don't They?, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 1998, at 9 ("[T]raining on
this subject [is] a proactive investment that companies are now almost required to make.");
David Rubenstein, Harassment Prevention Is Now a Must for U.S. Companies, 93 CORP.
LEGAL TIMES 31 (Aug. 1999) (reporting that recent "Supreme Court decisions were widely
interpreted to mean that having [training] programs in place could be a defense in a sexual
harassment suit, and many companies have since moved to establish them").
4' See, e.g., Shaw, 180 F.3d at 812-13 (counting training of managers as one factor sup-
porting summary judgment for employer based on affirmative defense); Harrison, 248 F.3d
at 1028 (considering lack of training as one factor illustrating the inadequacy of the em-
ployer's prevention efforts). Applying Lauren Edelman's theory of legal endogeneity, Su-
san Bisom-Rapp argues convincingly that the legal and human resource professionals actu-
ally created this legal standard through their own prior emphasis on training. See Susan
Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers: The Questionable Embrace of Em-
ployee Sexual Harassment Training by the Legal Profession, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 147, 156-61 (2001) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers].
49 Cf. Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2001) (re-
fusing to find employer's prevention efforts inadequate just because employees could not
recall the details of their training about the anti-harassment policy); EEOC v. Harbert-
Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510 (6th Cir. 2001) (denying judgment as matter of law, in part
because no anti-harassment training was given even though corporate policy mandated it).
50 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-54 (2001) (requiring employers with more than fifty
employees to provide sexual harassment training to supervisory personnel); 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/2-105(B)(5)(c) (2001) (requiring, among other things, that state agencies provide
sexual harassment training to all employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h (2001) (re-
quiring all employers to adopt a policy against sexual harassment and encouraging them to
offer sexual harassment training to all employees). The incentive to offer training is further
reinforced by the EEOC's policy guidance, issued in the wake of Faragher and Ellerth.
The EEOC implores employers to offer general anti-harassment training to all employees,
as well as targeted training to supervisory employees. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, EEOC
COMP. MAN. (BNA), June 18, 1999, N:4075, at 17, [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guid-
ance] available at http://www. eeoc.gov/docs/harassment.html.
"' See Emily Madoff, E-Mail's Role in Hostile Work Environment, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 23,
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certainly not necessary to the affirmative defense, are also weighed in the
employer's favor.53
There is, however, a certain disincentive for taking any preventative
measure beyond those expressly required by the affirmative defense. When a
victim complains, the employer, at least theoretically,54 cannot prevail on
the affirmative defense because the second prong requires the plaintiff
employee to have unreasonably failed to take advantage of corrective
opportunities provided by the employer to avoid harm." Thus, employers
may have a disincentive to undertake any employer measures that go be-
yond the minimum requirements if those additional measures actually
induce victims to complain. There is thus an "incentive to exercise a
minimal amount of care that satisfies the judicial standard but nonethe-
less results in an atmosphere that ultimately discourages complaints." 6
b. Correction
Two rules provide employers with an incentive to respond to com-
plaints of harassment. First, employers are liable for any harassment-
wrought by supervisors, co-workers, or third parties-about which they
knew or should have known and failed to stop." This negligence princi-
ple sets a minimum threshold for liability, thereby providing an incentive
for employers to intervene in all cases where they have actual or con-
structive notice of harassment.
1999, at S6 (urging employers to read all employee e-mail to protect against sexual har-
assment liability in the wake of Fragher and Ellerth).
'2 See Richard D. Wellbrock, Sexual Harassment Policies and Computer-Based Train-
ing, 26 CMiY. C. REV. 51, 65 (1999) (advocating a computer-based training model for
sexual harassment education, in part because it can tailor the training to user responses and
knowledge).
51 See Sindy J. Policy, Emplo'yer Monitoring of Employee Internet and Email Use: An
Effective Litigation Avoidance Tool, 17 COMPUTER & IN'rItNET L. 21 (2000).
51 See supra note 23.
55 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
51, David Sherwyn et al., Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your "1-800" Har-
assment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flows in the Affirmative
Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1301 (2001) (noting
the disincentive to going beyond compliance with basic standards of prevention). These
authors suggest that, under the current standard, employers:
aiming to avoid liability would be best served by not offering a 11-800] hotline or
other similar methods of reporting harassment that are easy and anonymous....
[Employers] would be well-advised not only to scrap the anonymous reporting
mechanisms, but also to eliminate or discontinue so-called "sexual harassment
training" programs for employees (but obviously not for managers) that go above
and beyond the reasonableness necessary to win on an Ellerth- or Faragher-based
motion.
hi. at 1300-01 (internal citations omitted).
" See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799.
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Beyond mere negligence, employers are also liable for all supervi-
sory hostile environment harassment unless they can satisfy the affirmative
defense requirements. The first prong of the affirmative defense, dis-
cussed above in the context of prevention, also requires employers to
prove that they have taken reasonable care "to ... correct any sexually
harassing behavior.""s Adequate correction entails two things: maintain-
ing an appropriate grievance procedure and responding appropriately to
actual complaints.
i. Grievance Procedures
In order to satisfy the second prong of the affirmative defense, em-
ployers must maintain a grievance procedure designed specifically to
handle sexual harassment complaints. 9 For liability purposes, the general
requirement is that a grievance procedure must be constructed to encour-
age complaints from victims.' The only specific rules to come from this
general standard are that an adequate procedure must include a bypass
process to permit a victim to avoid filing a complaint with the harasser,
and the policy must clearly identify those individuals designated to re-
ceive complaints.6 Beyond these minimal requirements, courts have tol-
erated varied complaint procedures and have given employers some dis-
cretion in mandating the type or form of complaint necessary to trigger a
formal investigation.62
ii. Response to Complaints
Beyond simply maintaining a complaint procedure, employers must
also adequately respond to known incidents of harassment. Employers
can acquire notice through formal complaints63 or readily observable har-
18 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
" See Molnar v. Booth, 229 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding employer's correc-
tive measures inadequate because the general anti -discrimination policy "did not provide
any guidance as to what employees should do in the face of sexual harassment").
611 Cf. Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1269 n.22 (M.D.
Ala. 2001) (refusing to grant employer summary judgment on the affirmative defense
where there was evidence to suggest that mid-level supervisors blocked plaintiff's attempts
to report harassment to higher-ranking supervisors); Thomas v. BET Soundstage Rest., 104
F. Supp. 2d 558, 565 (D. Md. 2000) (noting "evidence that the policy was implemented
with the use of intimidating interrogation tactics which could effectively discourage indi-
viduals from utilizing the complaint process" as an additional flaw in employer's efforts to
correct harassment).
61 See supra text accompanying note 38.62 See, e.g., Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1297-99 (1 1th Cir.
2000) (approving policy with only one person designated to receive complaints).
61 A corollary to this principle is that employers cannot honor a victim's request for in-
action without jeopardizing their subsequent ability to prove the affirmative defense. See,
e.g., O'Dell v. Trans World Entm't Corp., 153 F. Supp. 2d 378, 390 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
("[A]n employer has an obligation to investigate a claim of sexual harassment even when
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assment in the workplace; both trigger the duty to respond. 6 Courts have
given employers leeway to set their own complaint procedures,65 but have
said that these procedures should not be so narrow as to evade responsi-
bility for obvious problems of harassment. One employer was deprived of
the affirmative defense, for example, by failing to respond to a complaint
that did not use the precise words "sexual harassment," even though the
complainant described behavior that clearly violated the employer's in-
ternal policy.66 In contrast, another employer was exonerated from liabil-
ity despite the employee's claim that the employer had a duty, upon no-
ticing that she and her supervisor spent a great deal of time together, to
make sure her relationship with her supervisor was consensual.67
Based on these rules about notice, it appears that employers must in-
vestigate all harassment complaints they receive, 6 and they must take
responsive measures reasonably calculated to stop the harassment.69
the employee decides not to proceed with her complaint.").
6 See, e.g., EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 510 (6th Cir. 2001) (denying
employer summary judgment on the affirmative defense based in part on evidence that
"goosing was a frequent occurrence at the facility, but that no one was ever disciplined,
even when supervisors witnessed the practice"); Thomas, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (stating
that employer may be "charged with constructive knowledge of sexual harassment, even if
unreported, if the harassment was so broad in scope, and so permeated the workplace, that
it must have come to the attention of someone authorized to do something about it").
61 Some courts have found that the duty to respond is only triggered by a complaint
that correctly utilizes an employer's internal grievance procedure, even though the em-
ployer may have received actual notice of harassment through some other means. See, e.g.,
Madray, 208 F.3d at 1300 (complaint to non-designated managers does not put the em-
ployer on notice of harassment); EEOC v. Dinuba Med. Clinic, 222 F.3d 580, 587 (9th Cir.
2000) (suggesting that employer could have required complaints to be in writing, although
it did not). This approach, while perhaps consistent with the affirmative defense, ignores
the baseline negligence standard, which holds employers responsible for any harassment
that they knew about and failed to address. Cf. Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp.,
240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (complaining to co-workers does not trigger duty to
respond absent evidence that complaints "filtered up to management"). Some courts have
gone to the other extreme, charging an employer with constructive notice when employees,
on whom the employer has imposed an internal duty to report, learn of harassment,
whether or not they report it to the employer. See, e.g., Dinkins, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
6See Gentry v. Exp. Packaging Co., 238 F.3d 842, 848 (7th Cir. 2001).
67 See Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., No. 00-1604, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 3517, at * 11-
*12 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2001).
61 See, e.g., Beard v. Flying J., Inc., 266 F.3d 792, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (criticizing em-
ployer for failing to interview other female employees who had similar stories of harass-
ment and failing to react to allegations of recurring harassment by a supervisor who had
been warned); Cadena v. Pacesetter Corp., 224 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (criticiz-
ing the employer's investigation as "inadequate, if not a complete sham" where the em-
ployer did not even know which party was the harasser and which the victim); Ogden v.
Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1007 (8th Cir. 2000) (rejecting affirmative defense where
employer "neither conducted the 'thorough investigation' nor took the 'appropriate action'
promised by its ... policy").
69 See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Tech., 244 F.3d 1167, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that em-
ployer undertook "a paradigm of the reasonable efforts" by reviewing policy with offender,
reprimanding him, threatening to deny him a promotion, and conducting anti-harassment
training seminars for the entire work force); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864,
876 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing the lack of progressive discipline for repeat offenses as part of
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Thus, when a corporate officer responded to one victim's formal com-
plaint by telling her "that things had been that way for a long time at
[this company], that the business world was full of pricks like Charlie...
and ... to get used to it because that is the way the business world was,"
the employer failed to satisfy the second prong of the affirmative defense v0
The exact responsive measures that need to be taken are clearly re-
served to the employer's discretion.7' Successfully stopping harassment is
generally treated as a sufficient,7" but not necessary, condition for the
employer to prevail on the first prong of the affirmative defense.73
2. Communication to Employers
News of the Faragher and Ellerth decisions spread quickly through
the world of human resources. Employers may first have learned of the
decisions and their impact through newspaper reports, 4 EEOC guidelines
published the following year,7" or perhaps through the academic com-
employer's inadequate corrective measures). But cf. Reese v. Meritor Auto., Inc., 113 F.
Supp. 2d 822, 828 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (finding that corrective action may be sufficient even
when it is not designed to make the harasser suffer).
70 Cadena, 224 F.3d at 1209; see also EEOC v. R & R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 341 (4th
Cir. 2001) (finding corrective measures inadequate where employer accused complainant
of overreacting and failed to investigate her complaints); Beard v. Flying J., Inc., 116 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (S.D. Iowa 2000) (stating that jury could find employer's corrective
measures inadequate where the harasser was kept on as a manager despite numerous com-
plaints of harassment that the employer found to be credible).
71 See, e.g., Swingle v. Henderson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 625, 637 (D.N.J. 2001) ("If an em-
ployer chooses an adequate remedy to prevent sexual harassment, the aggrieved employee
cannot object to such a remedy and dictate instead that her employer take such remedial
action as the employee deems appropriate.").
1 See id. (holding that employer cannot be liable when its response stops harassment);
Anderson v. Dillard's, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1125 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (describing how
employer's corrective measures may be insufficient when, even though harassment stopped,
plaintiff continued to encounter other difficulties while working for the harasser).
71 See, e.g., Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199 F.3d 925, 932-34 (7th Cir. 1999) (granting
affirmative defense despite employer's failure to end harassment); Watkins v. Prof'l Sec.
Bureau, Ltd., 1999 WL 1032614, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 15, 1999) (per curiam) (concluding
that an employer can satisfy the first prong of the affirmative defense even without stop-
ping harassment following a complaint); Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d
283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) ("An employer need not prove success in preventing harassing
behavior in order to demonstrate that it exercised reasonable care in preventing and cor-
recting sexually harassing conduct."); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 396 (4th Cir. 1999)
("Sometimes ... an employer's reasonable attempt to prevent future harm will be frus-
trated by events that are unforeseeable and beyond the employer's control. The law re-
quires an employer to be reasonable, not clairvoyant or omnipotent."). But see Harbison v.
Pilot Air Freight, No. IP 99-0882-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5024, at *76-*78 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 16, 2001) (finding that recurring harassment undermines employer's claim that it took
reasonable measures to correct the problem).
14 See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 47, at 1 ("[E]mployment law specialists are reporting
a dramatic increase in inquiries and requests for training from large corporations that may
just need to 'tweak' their sexual harassment policy to small companies that need to start
from scratch."); Rubenstein, supra note 47, at 31 (describing the detailed prevention pro-
gram of one large company as a model for others).
71 See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 50.
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mentary that eventually emerged."6 But many employers were made aware
of the rules of liability and their obligations thereunder by lawyers and
consultants. Law firms issued warnings to their clients about the new rules.77
Employment law letters were published in droves." Employee- and man-
agement-side reporters tracked and interpreted the opinions for their con-
stituencies. 9 Bar associations and law firms offered continuing legal edu-
cation programs on current developments in harassment law." Conse-
quently, human resource consultants found themselves in high demand."'
Most of this advice was formulated as a "recipe[ ] for legal compli-
ance," urging employers to take specific steps to avoid harassment and
litigation.12 Evidence suggests that employers are quick to incorporate
this type of advice into their policies and procedures, given their desire to
avoid interference from courts and regulators, the pressure to appear con-
cerned about and compliant with anti-discrimination rules,"7 and the de-
sire to control the risk of litigation and its consequences. 4
76 See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environ-
ment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the
Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999) [hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace].
17 See, e.g., Samuel D. Walker & David S. Fortney, Sexual Harassment: The New Rules
of the Road, 6 METRO. CORP. COUNSEL, Dec. 1998, at 12 (identifying six practical steps
for employers to take to avoid liability under Faragher and Ellerth); see also Bisom-Rapp,
Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 76, at 976-80 (discussing the various mecha-
nisms by which lawyers transmit advice about new developments in anti-discrimination
law to employers).
78 See, e.g., Dinse, Knapp & McAndrew, P.C., Would Your Policies Withstand a 'Closer
Look'?, VT. EMP. L. LETTER (Nov. 1998) (describing the Court's new opinions and pro-
viding sample policies that would pass muster under them).
19 See, e.g., Michelle E. Phillips, EEOC Guidance on Sexual Harassment for Supervi-
sors, 5 ANDREWS SEXUAL HARASSMENT Lrrici. REP., Aug. 1999, at 3 (providing recom-
mendations to employers on how to "revise and distribute harassment policies in order to
comply with federal law").
8" See, e.g., SUFFOLK COUNTY BAR Ass'N, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE
(May 17, 2000) (on file with author).
11 See, e.g, Rebecca Ganzel, What Sexual Harassment Really Prevents, 10 TRAINING 86
(Oct. 1998) (reporting that " trainers saw their workload spike up sharply" after the Supreme
Court decided Faragher and Ellerth).
12 Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 76, at 980 (drawing conclu-
sion based on content analysis of advice and training materials produced by management-
side employment lawyers). Some advice is explicitly designed to reduce liability. For ex-
ample, employers are warned about how to document investigations so that they will have
evidence to use at trial. Aronson, supra note 47, at I (reporting that many employers now
require all employees to sign a document confirming they have read the company's sexual
harassment policy); Canoni, supra note 33, at 12 ("Employers must conduct both regular
and follow-up training sessions to ensure that new hires and transfers are informed. Atten-
dance should be mandatory, with sign-in sheets and follow-up sessions for absent employ-
ees."); see also James J. Oh, Internal Sexual Harassment Complaints: Investigating to Win,
18 EMPL. REL. L.J. 227, 227 (1992) (outlining components of investigation necessary to
"avoid or limit liability").
83 Employers arguably create goodwill by adapting their workplace environments to
common cultural norms, one of which is "adherence to antidiscrimination principles."
Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 76, at 987.
84 See id. at 984-88. Bisom-Rapp also makes out a compelling case that lawyers who
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3. Employer Responses
Employers, by and large, have incorporated the incentives described
above into their workplace structures.5 Even before the Supreme Court
clarified the standards for liability, most employers had an array of meas-
ures in place designed to prevent harassment and limit their exposure to
liability."6 Studies indicate that the widespread enactment of employment
policies and procedures began in the late 1960s, spurred by the enact-
ment of Title VII and the surrounding uncertainty about employers' re-
sponsibilities and their potential for liability.8 7
Policies and procedures dealing specifically with sexual harassment
came later, many after the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Meritor
Savings Bank, which made clear that liability turned, at least in part, on
employer behavior."8 Anecdotal evidence suggests that employers have
continued to enact and update policies in response to incentives created
by the Supreme Court's recent clarification of the liability regime. 9
A 1999 study conducted by the Society for Human Resources Man-
agement (SHRM Survey) reported that ninety-seven percent of respond-
ing employers have written policies against sexual harassment. 90 Most of
these policies include the legally required elements such as a definition
of prohibited conduct (ninety-three percent) and identification of a chain
of communication for making complaints (ninety-three percent), as well
as additional "best practices" elements like a stated intention or mission
to eradicate workplace harassment (eighty-one percent) or a promise of
confidentiality (seventy-eight percent)."' Approaches to disseminating in-
formation to employees vary among employers. Eighty-five percent in-
give prevention advice overstate the risks, thereby creating a stronger need for their serv-
ices. See id. at 983; see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law:
The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 L. & Soc'y REV. 47, 74-75 (1992); Donald
C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers Trans-
mitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 379 (1997) (predicting that the "systematic
overstatement of risk is a robust, if not universal, phenomenon in the legal profession").
11 Other institutions have implemented sexual harassment prevention measures as well.
See, e.g., Troy M. Johnson, Sexual Harassment Prevention: A Survey of Current Practices,
CUPA J. 21, 22 (Fall 1999/Winter 2000) (surveying universities about the types of preven-
tative and corrective measures they have undertaken).
11 Although this chronology might suggest that employers are motivated by something
other than litigation prevention, most employers were simply (correctly) anticipating that
these measures would help them avoid future liability. Employer behavior, in turn, helped
create the legal standard itself. See Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note
76, at 969 (describing role of employer norms in creating standards of liability).
11 See id. at 968 (describing sociological studies by Frank Dobbin and Lauren Edelman).
XX477 U.S. 57, 71-73 (1986).
x See Phillips, supra note 79, at 3.
'( See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 6. Another survey, conducted by Human Re-
sources Executive, reported that sexual harassment policies are the most common of all
employer policies, enacted by at least ninety-five percent of their respondents. See HUMAN
RESOURCES EXECUTIVE 39 (Dec. 1993).
1' See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 7.
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clude the harassment policy in the employee handbook, but only sixty-
one percent review the policy in a training session.9 2 Forty-two percent
post their policies in common areas."
Many employers now undertake preventative measures beyond sim-
ply adopting and distributing an anti-harassment policy."4 More than half
of employers (sixty-two percent) provide sexual harassment prevention
training, with larger organizations more likely to offer it than smaller ones. 9
Most employers that offer training make it mandatory for their employ-
ees, especially supervisory personnel, and forty percent rely on legal counsel
or outside consultants to conduct it." Every federal agency provides
training, although only one-third make it mandatory for all employees.97
Larger employers, particularly those with documented problems of
harassment, have taken other measures to prevent future harassment and
avoid future litigation. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, for
example, after settling private and EEOC lawsuits at a cost of more than
$40 million,' 8 hired a former Secretary of Labor to conduct an audit of
the company's employment practices and workplace environment.9 Pur-
suant to the auditor's findings, the company adopted a zero-tolerance
policy for harassment and created an entire administrative department
devoted to training employees about the policy and investigating harass-
ment complaints. t ' In addition to requiring mandatory re-training every
two years for employees, Mitsubishi increased investigations of com-
plaints and the imposition of discipline on offenders.'
Employers have formalized their corrective measures as well as their
preventative ones. Eighty-six percent of respondents to the SHRM Sur-
vey reported that they have formal investigatory processes for sexual har-
assment. Most involve members of the human resource department in the
investigation (ninety-three percent); in-house legal staff members are
involved by significantly fewer employers (twenty-two percent).0 2 Inves-
tigations are relatively short, lasting on average between two and seven
12 See id.
See id.
, This survey suggests that employers either have not been counseled as to the
"efficient" level of prevention or are trying to do more than limit liability. See supra text
accompanying notes 54-56.
15 See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 8.
11 See id. at 9.
97 See USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 42.
See Mitsubishi Harassment Settlement Approved, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998, at D20.
' See Barnaby J. Feder, $34 Million Settles Suit for Women at Auto Plant, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 1998, at A]2.
"" See Peter Aronson, Mitsubishi Comes Back From Disaster of 1998, NAT'i L.J.
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business days.0 3 Many employers have also instituted mediation or arbi-
tration to resolve harassment complaints without resort to litigation."
D. Victims: Incentives, Communication, and Responses
1. Victim Incentives
The new regime targets victim behavior, as well as that of the em-
ployer and the harasser. The primary incentive comes from the second
prong of the affirmative defense, which requires the employer to prove
that "the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.""' 5 If the employer can prove that it behaved well
and that the victim failed to properly report the harassment, it can prevail
on the affirmative defense.
As a general matter, courts have strictly enforced the victim's duty to
complain. Cases analyzing this prong of the affirmative defense have fo-
cused on whether the victim made correct use of the grievance proce-
dures, how long the victim waited to complain, and whether a victim who
failed to complain had any justification for her silence.
Courts have also mandated that victims strictly comply with the pro-
cedures outlined in the employer's anti-harassment policy, as long as the
policy was made available to employees." 6 For example, an employee who
complains about harassment to her direct supervisor rather than to some-
one designated in the policy is generally held not to have taken advantage
of corrective opportunities provided by the employer.0 7 Courts also do
not generally permit victims to rely on outside complaints to the EEOC
or a union as a substitute for utilizing the employer's internal complaint
procedures, even though the complaints are eventually reported back to
(1 See id.
'' See infra text accompanying notes 401-402.
101 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
'16 See, e.g., Mernik v. Classic Cars, Inc., NO 3:99-CV-1327-P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9373, at *34-*35 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2000) (finding plaintiff's mention to employer of
"crude and vulgar" behavior was insufficient to constitute availment of the employer's
sexual harassment procedures).
I'l See Dowdy v. North Carolina, No. 01-1706, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24382, at *3
(4th Cir. Nov. 13, 2001) (holding that employer satisfied second prong of the affirmative
defense through evidence that employee, despite attending a sexual harassment training
course and having a copy of the sexual harassment policy available to her, complained to
wrong supervisor); Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1300-02 (11th
Cir. 2000) (finding that complaining to managers not designated by the policy is unreason-
able for purposes of the affirmative defense); Green v. Wills Group, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d
618, 626 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that complaining to wrong person rendered victim's be-
havior unreasonable); cf. Cherry v. Menard, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1177-78 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (holding that speaking with manager not specified in policy may be reasonable since
designated person called her "paranoid" and was generally unresponsive to her complaints).
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the employer.'1s Additionally, victims must cooperate with the employer's
investigation. "
Courts have found delays as short as seven days to be unreasonable,"
0
though the acceptable lag time varies with the severity of the harass-
ment.'" Courts have not been sympathetic to claims that the victim was
waiting to see if the behavior continued or to gather more evidence of har-
assment.' 12
Courts have been generally reluctant to accept excuses for failing to
complain." 3 In many jurisdictions, a "generalized fear of retaliation" con-
stitutes an insufficient justification for ignoring an employer's internal
grievance procedure.' " There has, however, been some recognition at the
summary judgment stage that victims should have the opportunity to prove
that the fears they harbor have an objective or reasonable basis."5 For
"ll See, e.g., Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding
that electing to file a grievance with the EEOC rather than the employer constitutes an
unreasonable failure to take advantage of corrective opportunities); cf. Haugerud v. Amery
Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 699-700 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding victim's external complaint to
be an adequate substitute because district's policy made internal grievance procedure op-
tional).
""0 See, e.g., Hill v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 218 F.3d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
failing to give honest answers to employer during investigation is unreasonable); McClu-
ney v. Cuomo, 83 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 893, 899 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (finding that
denying to investigator that harassment occurred is unreasonable). But see Harbison v.
Pilot Air Freight, No. IP 99-0882-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5024, at *81 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
16, 2001) (holding that failing to turn over plaintiff's notes to the employer for purposes of
the investigation was not necessarily unreasonable).
'"'See Marsicano v. Am. Soc'y of Safety Eng'rs, No. 97-C7819, 1998 WL 603128, at
*7 (N.D. 11. Sept. 4, 1998) (finding seven-day delay unreasonable); see also Jackson, 272
F.3d at 1026 (holding victim's more than nine-month delay before complaining to be too
long under the second prong); Newsome v. Admin. Office of Courts, 103 F. Supp. 2d 807,
820 (D.N.J. 2000) (describing victim's two-year delay before complaining as "eminently
unreasonable"). But see, e.g., EEOC v. Harbert- Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 511 (6th Cir.
2001) (excusing victim for failure to complain after first incident because "he was new to
the company, had no witnesses, and the harasser was his supervisor").
I See Matvia v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., Inc., 259 F.3d 261, 269-70 (4th Cir. 2001)
(finding that the "gravity and numerosity of the incidents" made it unreasonable for victim
to have waited to complain).
'12 See id. at 269. But see Harbison, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5024, at *80 (holding that
jury may find it reasonable for plaintiff to delay complaining until conduct reached a "cer-
tain level of persistence and offensiveness").
''I But see Reed v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1069
(M.D. Tenn. 2000) (identifying factors that may excuse a victim's failure to complain).
"14 Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 248 F.3d 1014, 1026 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that "a
generalized fear of retaliation does not excuse a failure to report sexual harassment")
(quoting Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2001));
Leopold v. Baccarat, Inc., 239 F.3d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that being "too
scared" is not a justification for failing to complain without evidence to substantiate such
fears); Hill, 218 F.3d at 644 (holding that "apprehension does not eliminate the require-
ment that the employee report harassment"); Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481,
493 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that conclusory allegations of feared repercussions do not
excuse failure to complain).
11 See, e.g., Anderson v. Deluxe Homes, 131 F. Supp. 2d 637, 651 (M.D. Pa. 2001)
(holding that warnings from other employees that complaint would result in retaliatory
firing might make plaintiff's failure to complain reasonable).
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example, prior unresponsiveness of the employer may excuse a victim's
failure to complain. ' 6
2. Communication to Victims
The legal incentive for victims to respond to harassment in certain,
narrowly defined ways is clear, but it is unlikely that victims will both be
aware of the incentive and conform their behavior accordingly. Mecha-
nisms for relaying advice to potential or actual victims are obviously lim-
ited. Lawyers and consultants who conduct training seminars and work-
shops represent the employer and may therefore predictably hesitate to
give advice to employees that will have the effect of preserving a cause
of action against the employer. Unlike defense lawyers, plaintiffs' law-
yers rarely have the opportunity to counsel their clients before the of-
fending action occurs."7
3. Victim Responses
Sexual harassment victims have traditionally tended not to utilize
internal complaint procedures or otherwise formally report problems of
harassment. Filing a complaint with an employer is in fact the least likely
response for a victim of harassment."8 According to a recent study of
federal employees, forty-four percent of those who had experienced sex-
ual harassment took no action, while only twelve percent reported the
conduct to a supervisor or other official." 9 The low rate of reporting is
somewhat startling given that the workplace surveyed is one in which
every department has an established sexual harassment policy, 2 ° and sev-
enty-eight percent of survey respondents reported knowing about the
formal complaint channels available to them.' Other surveys have
affirmed comparably low rates of reporting. 1
22
116 See, e.g., Young v. R.R. Morrison & Son, 159 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Miss.
2000) (noting that "a plaintiff may bring forward evidence of prior unresponsive action by
the company or management to actual complaints" as a reason for not complaining). But
see Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083-84 (E.D. Tex.
2000) (finding victim's failure to complain due to supervisors' participation in the harass-
ment and their lack of appropriate response to harassment committed by others was unrea-
sonable when complaint procedures provided for alternative means of reporting harassment).
"' See Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace, supra note 76, at 981.
18 See, e.g., USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 33 (reporting that only six percent of
victims filed a formal complaint).
' See id. at 30.
1) See id. at 40.
121 See id. at 33.
122 See Jean W. Adams et al., Sexual Harassment of University Students, 24 J.C. STU-
DENT PERSONNEL 484, 488-89 (1983) (finding that no student experiencing sexual ad-
vances, propositions, or extortion reported the incident to university officials); CULBERT-
SON ET AL., supra note 7, at 17 (showing victim reporting rates of twenty-four percent for
enlisted women and twelve percent for female officers); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., The
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These surveys also reveal that little has changed over a period of
time in which employers have made significant improvements in their
equal employment practices and procedures generally, as well as to their
harassment policies specifically. A 1981 survey of federal employees re-
vealed that only three percent of female respondents who had experi-
enced harassment filed a formal complaint with their employer, while
sixty-one percent did nothing at all.'23 A 1988 survey of the same workforce
showed a similarly low rate of reporting, with only five percent of vic-
tims filing an internal complaint.'24 A 1995 survey shows victims of har-
assment to be almost as unlikely to file formal complaints of harassment
with their employers as they were fifteen years prior.'
2 5
Despite employee surveys that suggest the rate of reporting has stag-
nated at a relatively low level, surveys of employers suggest some in-
crease in reporting. 26 Employers have reported an increase in the filing of
internal grievances and complaints,'27 with larger organizations more likely
to have complaints of harassment filed against them than smaller ones.'28
Even with an increase in the absolute number of internal complaints,
these surveys support the conclusion that victims remain, overall, un-
likely to report harassment to their employers. Large employers, for ex-
ample, receive an average of six complaints per year, about two-tenths of
one percent per 100 employees. 21 Yet, surveys done in the same time
period, albeit based on different workforces, show that four in ten women
report having experienced harassing behaviors in the previous two years. 3 '
Taken together, these numbers suggest a significant gap between the
Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, 32 J.
VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 152, 162 (1988) (finding that only three percent of their sample had
attempted to report a sexual harassment experience); BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIORS AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN,
AND ORGANIZATIONS 71 (1985) [hereinafter GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE] (describ-
ing a survey of workers in Los Angeles in which eighteen percent of women harassed re-
ported it to someone in authority); James F. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Blue-Collar Blues: The
Sexual Harassment of Women Autoworkers, 9 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 271, 286-87 (1982)
(showing a victim reporting rate of only seven percent for harassed female automobile
workers); see also The Civil Rights Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. I Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong., 1 st Sess., 172 (1991) (statement of Dr. Freada
Klein) (estimating that at least ninety percent of sexual harassment victims are unwilling to
report the conduct).
121 USMSPB 1981, supra note 6, at 67, 71.
124 USMSPB 1988, supra note 7, at 27.
125 See, e.g., USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 29 ("The single most common response
of employees who are targets of sexual harassing behaviors hasn't changed ... since 1980.
That response has been, and continues to be, to ignore the behavior or do nothing.").
126 See SHRM SURVEY, supra note 9, at 5.
'27 See id. (reporting that thirty percent of complaints in a recent four-year period were
received in the last year, compared with only fifteen percent in the first).
121 See id. (reporting that seventy-five percent of employers with 250 employees or
more had at least one sexual harassment complaint during the survey period, compared
with only thirty-five percent of smaller employers).
129 See id.
I3 USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 13.
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number of women harassed and the number of women who report the
harassment. Surveys of victims and employers both indicate that al-
though victims respond in myriad ways to harassing behavior, most are
informal and nonconfrontational. 13 1
There are a number of studies designed to examine the ways in
which victims respond to harassing behavior. 3 2 Many of them rely on
participants' responses to questions about how they would respond to
various hypothetical scenarios to assess the likely victim response to har-
assment. These laboratory studies tend to show that many participants
believe they would be able to handle the situation themselves. Fifty-three
percent of respondents in one study indicated they would "have a talk"
with the harasser. 3 3 Seventy-nine percent of respondents in another study
who had "received at least one sexual overture from a man at work re-
ported that they were confident they could handle future overtures."'134
One problem with these studies, however, is that these optimistic conclu-
sions by research participants about their ability to handle hypothetical
situations of harassment are rarely replicated by real victims.'35
Real victims tend at first to ignore incidents of harassment and sub-
sequently respond with mild retributions like, "I'm not your type.' 36 They
also tend to find ways to rationalize the harassment by attributing it to
non-recurring circumstances, like the wearing of a particular outfit, or
treating it as a joke.'37 Women also take sometimes costly steps to avoid
the harasser, the job, or the situation, rather than deal with the harass-
ment directly.'38 Early studies rated these responses according to their
3I See generally Grossman, supra note 5, at 723-28 (reviewing literature on victim re-
sponse); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women's Stories in Sexual Har-
assment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 136-41 (2001) (reviewing literature
on victim response); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment-
Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to Professors Beiner and
Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 175-84 (2001) (reviewing literature
on victim response).
12 See, e.g., David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, The Identification and Classification
of Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 10 J. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 12 (1989) [hereinafter Terpstra &
Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions]; see also Barbara A. Gutek &
Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed Organizations: Consequences of and Coping
with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 28, 37 (1993) (reviewing studies).
"I Gutek & Koss, supra note 132, at 37 (reviewing surveys and studies).
134 Id.
131 See id.; see also Adams et al., supra note 122, at 489 (noting the "marked contrast
between what students think they would do and what students actually do when confronted
with [sexually harassing] behaviors"); Louise F. Fitzgerald et al., Why Didn't She Just
Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implications of Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment, 51 J. Soc. ISSUES 117, 119 (1995) (noting that "actual victims have been
shown to behave quite differently than research participants or the general public say they
would behave").
136 See Gutek & Koss, supra note 132, at 37.
137 See id. at 38.
131 See id.
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degree of assertiveness, finding that real victims of harassment tend to
respond in relatively non-assertive ways.'
A later study, by Louise Fitzgerald, Suzanne Swan, and Karla Fischer,
created an alternative framework, one that would both avoid the central
critique of laboratory studies-that they do not predict the responses of
real victims-and give a more complete depiction of victim response. 4"
These researchers thus developed a system of coding actual victim re-
sponses to a variety of sexual harassment prevalence surveys. Fitzgerald
and her colleagues also shifted the focus from measuring the degree of
assertiveness to classifying responses as either internally or externally
focused.' This approach captures the cognitive strategies used by vic-
tims and gives a more complete picture of the ways victims respond to
harassment. 142
The Fitzgerald study identifies common internally focused responses
such as endurance (ignoring the harassment), denial (pretending it is not
happening), reattribution (reinterpreting the situation so it is not defined
as harassment), illusory control (blaming oneself), and detachment (sepa-
ration from harasser or situation).'43 Common externally focused re-
sponses include avoidance of the harasser or situation, appeasement (putting
off the harasser without direct confrontation), and social support (talking
to friends or co-workers about the harassment), as well as more assertive
responses like confronting the harasser or filing a complaint. The most in-
frequent response, the authors concluded, "is to seek institutional/ or-
ganizational relief. Victims apparently turn to such strategies as a last
resort when all other efforts have failed."'44
Given the vast literature documenting the unwillingness of victims to
file formal complaints and the reasons behind it, the question becomes
whether the new legal rules of liability will induce changes in the work-
place that might in turn increase reporting rates. That question is ad-
dressed in Part II below, which evaluates the likelihood that the legal re-
gime will improve corrective remedies for harassment victims.
' See, e.g, James E. Gruber, How Women Handle Sexual Harassment: A Literature
Review, 74 Soc. Sci. RES. 3 (1989); James E. Gruber & Lars Bjorn, Women's Responses to
Sexual Harassment: An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource
Models, 67 Soc. Sci. Q. 814 (1986) [hereinafter Gruber & Bjorn, Women's Responses];
Gutek & Koss, supra note 132, at 37-38; Terpstra & Baker, The Identification and
Classification of Reactions, supra note 132, at 2.
141 Fitzgerald et al., supra note 135, at 119.
"' See id.
112 See id.
'13 See id. at 119-20.44 Id. at 120.
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II. EVALUATING THE NEW REGIME: PREVENTION OF HARASSMENT
As described in the previous Part, the affirmative defense and related
rules of liability are calculated to influence three groups of individuals:
employers, harassers, and victims. These rules should, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, contribute to the goals of Title VII: (1) to prevent
discriminatory conduct (here, harassment),'45 and (2) to compensate vic-
tims.'46 This Part examines whether the incentives created by the affirma-
tive defense and adopted by employers are likely to serve the goal of pre-
vention by reducing the incidence of sexual harassment.'47
For this legal regime to prevent harassment, the legal incentives must
not only influence employers to take some preventative steps, but also
ensure that the particular steps taken have a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess. Understanding whether the law sets up a framework calculated to
ensure success, rather than just compliance, requires a review of the lit-
erature concerning both the general causes of harassment and how dis-
crete, testable preventative measures have been shown in empirical stud-
ies to influence harasser behavior.
A. The Causes of Harassment
Both individual and organizational factors are implicated in the prob-
lem of sexual harassment. Research shows proclivities to harass based on
individual personality and group status, as well as organizational struc-
tures that permit those proclivities to be indulged.
141See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (crafting
holding to conform to "Title Vii's deterrent purposes"); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527
U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (describing Title VII's "primary objective" as a "prophylactic one")
(citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)).
46 See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995)
("Compensation for injuries caused by the prohibited discrimination is [one goal of Title
VII]."); Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 282 (1994) (stating that the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 "reflects Congress' desire to afford victims of discrimination more complete
redress for violations of [Title VII]"); see also Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545 (acknowledging
Title VIi's goal of remedying harm).
"I Some important contributions to this inquiry have been made recently. See Beiner,
Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 1, at 324, 334; Susan Bisom-Rapp, An
Ounce of Prevention is a Poor Substitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing
Jurisprudence of Education and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 BER-
KELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2001); Bisom-Rapp, Fixing Watches with Sledgehammers,
supra note 48.
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1. Individual Factors
Research about sexual harassment has revealed several different ex-
planatory models that focus on the conduct and characteristics of the in-
dividuals who engage in harassing behavior. These models explore who
(individually or because of particular group membership) is likely to har-
ass and, to a lesser extent, what motivates their conduct. This Section
discusses the natural/biological model and the boundary differentiation
model, both of which bear on the issue of employer liability.
a. The Natural/Biological Model
The literature on sexual harassment often cites a natural/biological
model of harassment, which hypothesizes that sexual harassment is a
function of sexual desire generally and a function of men's tendency to-
ward sexual aggression specifically. 4 8 Pursuant to this model, men are
said to harass more than women-and to choose women as victims-be-
cause they have stronger sex drives, and their sexually aggressive be-
havior is perpetually reinforced by society. The model assumes not only
that men are motivated by strong sex drives to commit harassment, but
also that men and women are sexually attracted to one another and tend
to act on those impulses.'49 Intent to dominate or discriminate is not part
of this theory.5 '
Although this model has been dismissed by most academics,' 5' sur-
vey data and empirical studies do reveal that men are significantly more
likely to engage in harassing behavior than women. At least ninety per-
cent of all harassment is committed by men,' 2 and men show a greater
propensity toward harassment in laboratory studies." 3
"I See Sandra S. Tangri et al., Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models,
38 J. Soc. ISSUES 33 (1982); David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, Sexual Harassment at
Work: The Psychological Issues, in VULNERABLE WORKERS: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL
ISSUES (M. J. Davidson & J. Earnshaw eds., 1991).
'49 See Tangri et al., supra note 148, at 35.
" See id.
Margaret S. Stockdale, The Role of Sexual Misperceptions of Women's Friendliness
in an Emerging Theory of Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 84, 94-95 (1993)
(describing the natural/biological model and basis for rejecting it).
"
2 See USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 18 (ninety-three percent); SHRM SURVEY, su-
pra note 9, at 5 (ninety-two percent); see also EEOC CHARGE STATISTICS, supra note 9 (in
2001, only fourteen percent of charges were filed by men). These surveys do not, however,
give merit to other assumptions from this model, like the claim that harassers would "more
likely be unmarried, and recipient/victims would be similar in age, race, and occupational
status." Stockdale, supra note 151, at 94.
151 Elissa L. Perry et al., Propensity to Sexually Harass: An Exploration of Gender
Differences, 38 SEX ROLES 443, 454 (1998) (finding men to have higher Likelihood to
Sexually Harass (LSH) scores than women). The system for evaluating an individual's
propensity to harass, developed by John Pryor, is discussed infra notes 160-162 and ac-
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Courts themselves have, perhaps unwittingly, drawn on aspects of
this model in analyzing cases of opposite-sex harassment. The model's
assumption about male sex drives was at play in early sexual harassment
cases, one of which characterized a supervisor's harassing behavior as
simply "satisfying a sexual urge" rather than committing an act of dis-
crimination.'54 The same court drew on the model's assumption about
mutual sexual attraction, suggesting that sexual harassment was a natural
outgrowth of having men and women work together that could be pre-
vented only by having "employees who were asexual."'55
The naturallbiological model is also reflected in contemporary cases,
which tend to assume that sexual behavior directed at a member of the
opposite sex is motivated by sexual desire.' 6 Rather than make an inquiry
into whether a particular incident occurred "because of sex"-a statutory
requirement that distinguishes behavior that is illegally discriminatory
from behavior that is simply abusive-courts have instead tended to pre-
sume that any sexual behavior directed at a member of the opposite sex is
motivated by sexual attraction to the victim and, absent evidence of the
harasser's homosexuality or bisexuality, necessarily occurs because of
the victim's sex.
57
Despite the prevalent assumption that men are more likely to harass
than women, little has been done to explore why men are more likely to
harass, even though there has been a recent resurgence of an analogous
sociobiological claim about why men commit rape.5 5 The focus, instead,
has been on developing harasser profiles or models for predicting likely
harassers.
Surveys, which have been responsible for publicizing a wealth of in-
formation about the prevalence of harassment and the demographic char-
acteristics of victims, have unfortunately been of little use in detailing
companying text.
"I Come v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (dismissing sexual
harassment complaint for failure to state a claim under Title VII).
155 Id.
16 See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int'l Sec., Inc., No. 00-7293, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 417,
at *7-*8 (D.C. Jan. 11, 2002).
"I See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683,
1716 (1998) (noting and criticizing this tendency). See also GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORK-
PLACE, supra note 122, at 1, 15-18, 129-52.
151 See RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE: BIo-
LOGICAL BASIS OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000); see also Owen Jones, Sex, Culture, and the
Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999). There
has also been some effort to use evolutionary psychology to explain sexual harassment.
See, e.g., Michael V. Studd & Urs E. Gattiker, The Evolutionary Psychology of Sexual
Harassment in Organizations, 12 ETHOLOGY & SOC. BIOLOGY 249, 281 (1991) (finding
support for hypothesis that "the psychological mechanisms underlying male sexual behav-
ior have been designed by selection to motivate males to seek out and take advantage of as
many sexual opportunities as feasible given the nature of the current social environment").
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harasser characteristics. Harassers are, of course, unlikely to self-report,
though some information about them is provided by victims.'59
While surveys have not been particularly useful in examining har-
asser characteristics, studies utilizing a laboratory setting to examine char-
acteristics common to harassers have been instructive. The most significant
innovation was contributed by John Pryor, who developed a predictive
scale to rate potential harassers according to their Likelihood to Sexually
Harass (LSH)."' The rating system focuses only on quid pro quo harass-
ment, a relatively severe form in which a supervisor threatens to withhold
a reward or exact a punishment if a subordinate refuses to submit to sex-
ual advances.
The propensity scale rates participants on a range from a High LSH
to a Low LSH. The rating is formed by evaluating a participant's re-
sponses to a series of questions after reading different sexual harassment
scenarios in which a male has the power to control a subordinate female's
working conditions. The participant is asked, among other things, whether
he would be likely to behave in the same way as the harasser in a par-
ticular scenario if he was assured that he would not be caught. 6 ' High
ratings on this scale tend to be positively correlated with sexist beliefs
and similarly high ratings on a Likelihood to Rape scale, and negatively
correlated with support for feminist attitudes and "empathic perspective-
taking."'
16 2
The research about individual proclivities finds, as surveys have, that
men are more likely to harass than women, and that beliefs about gender
and sex roles may further emphasize those tendencies. It may also sup-
port the theory that harassment is caused by male sexual aggression. But,
because the participants in studies employing Pryor's methodology are
asked to assess their likelihood to harass only when there is no possibil-
ity of punishment, the resulting LSH rating may be more reflective of
their willingness to abuse power than their sexual desire or aggression
per se."I3
b. The Boundary Differentiation Model
Another promising line of inquiry may be into perceptions of har-
assment and difficulties with boundary differentiation, which some re-
searchers have suggested can explain a great deal of the sexual harass-
"' See John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEx ROL.ES 269, 270
(1987).
Id. at 269.
See Stockdale, supra note 151, at 84, 86 (describing the LSH rating system).
162 Id.
163 See Perry et al., supra note 153, at 445 (discussing Pryor's studies).
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ment that occurs in the workplace."6 Central to this approach is the near-
universal empirical finding that men and women perceive sexual harass-
ment differently, 6 ' although studies disagree as to the magnitude of such
differences.'66
Gender differences in perception operate in two ways. First, studies
show that where conduct is clearly sexual, men are more likely to see the
situation positively, where women are more likely to perceive it nega-
tively or as harassing.'67 Second, men may be more likely to perceive
164 See, e.g., Antonia Abbey, Misperception of Friendly Behavior as Sexual Interest: A
Survey of Naturally Occurring Incidents, II PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 173 (1987); Antonia
Abbey, Sex Differences in Attributions for Friendly Behavior: Do Males Misperceive Fe-
males' Friendliness?, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 (1982) [hereinafter Abbey,
Sex Differences]; Catherine B. Johnson et al., Persistence of Men's Misperceptions of
Friendly Cues Across a Variety of Interpersonal Encounters, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 463
(1991); Frank E. Saal et al., Friendly or Sexy? It May Depend on Whom You Ask, 13 Psy-
CHOL. WOMEN Q. 263 (1989); Stockdale, supra note 151, at 84.
"I' See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, The Reasonable Woman Standard: A Meta-Analytic
Review of Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 22 LAW & HUM. BE-
HAV. 33, 35 (1998) ("[M]en and women often, but not invariably, perceive social-sexual
behavior, especially in the workplace, in different ways.") (citations omitted); see also
Louise F. Fitzgerald, Sexual Harassment: Violence Against Women in the Workplace, 48
AM. PSYCHOL. 1070, 1070-76 (1993); Mary A. Gowan & Raymond A. Zimmerman, Im-
pact of Ethnicity, Gender and Previous Experience on Juror Judgments in Sexual Harass-
ment Cases, 26 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 596, 596-617 (1996); GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORK-
PLACE, supra note 122, at 71 (1985); Barbara A. Gutek et al., Interpreting Social-Sexual
Behavior in a Work Setting, 22 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 30 (1983) [hereinafter Gutek, So-
cial-Sexual Behavior]; William H. Hendrix et al., Sexual Harassment and Gender Differ-
ences, 13 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 235, 247 (1998) (finding evidence to support
hypothesis that "females saw potentially harassing events as more sexually harassing than
their male counterparts"); Gary N. Powell, Effects of Sex Role Identity and Sex on
Definitions of Sexual Harassment, 14 SEX ROLES 9, 16-17 (1986); ROSEMARIE SKAINE,
POWER AND GENDER: ISSUES IN SEXUAL DOMINANCE AND HARASSMENT 178 (1996) (citing
studies showing difference between male and female perceptions of harassment); see also
Adams et al., supra note 122, at 487 (finding that female students are more likely to define
behavior as sexual harassment in every category, particularly with respect to undue atten-
tion, sexist comments, and verbal advances). But see Danielle Foulis & Marita P. McCabe,
Sexual Harassment: Factors Affecting Attitudes and Perceptions, 37 SEX ROLES 773, 788
(1997) (finding no support for hypothesis that perceptions of sexual harassment vary by
gender); John J. Hartnett et al., Perceptions of Males and Females Toward Sexual Harass-
ment and Acquiescence, 4 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 291, 296-97 (1989) (finding no
gender difference in recommended discipline for harassing supervisor or in negatively
rating the harasser).
166 Blumenthal, supra note 165, at 46; see also Douglas D. Baker et al., Perceptions of
Sexual Harassment: A Re-Examination of Gender Differences, 124 J. PSYCHOL. 409, 410,
412 (1990) [hereinafter Baker et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment] (suggesting that
"gender differences in perceptions of sexual harassment may be overstated").
167 See, e.g., S. Gayle Baugh & Diana Page, A Field Investigation of Gender-Based
Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 13 J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 451,
458-59 (1998) (finding a marginally significant effect that women perceive sociosexual
behaviors at work as more harassing than men); Gutek et al., Social-Sexual Behavior, su-
pra note 165, at 30, 44 (finding that women are likely to view ambiguous sexual behaviors
less positively than men); Barbara A. Gutek et al., Sexuality and the Workplace, 1 BASIC &
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 259-60, 264 (1980); Alison M. Konrad & Barbara A. Gutek,
Impact of Work Experiences on Attitudes Toward Sexual Harassment, 31 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
422, 435 (1986); Paula M. Popovich et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment as a Func-
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ambiguous social interaction as having a sexual undertone than women;
when men respond in kind, women may find "the response to be unin-
vited and unwelcome."'' 68 Conversely, when sexual behavior is initiated
by women, men tend to find it flattering rather than harassing.'6 9
To the extent that men and women attach different interpretations to
sociosexual behaviors in the workplace 7" and have differing thresholds
for unwanted sexual attention,'7 ' boundary differentiation problems may
result. These problems are most applicable to hostile environment har-
assment. Differences in perception based on gender are more exaggerated
with respect to less severe conduct, such as sexual jokes or comments. The
differences tend to abate when perceptions relate to conduct that is either
physical, assaultive, or explicitly based on a threat, because most indi-
viduals can easily identify these behaviors as harassing regardless of
gender. '72
Other studies have tried to distinguish between differences in per-
ception based on gender per se and differences based on gender roles and
gender stereotypes.'73 For example, one study of the influence of gender
roles on perceptions of harassment purported to show that women rated
tion of Sex of Rater and Incident Form and Consequence, 27 SEX ROLES 609, 622 (1992).
161 Baugh & Page, supra note 167, at 452; see, e.g., Abbey, Sex Differences, supra note
164, at 831-38; Robin M. Kowalski, Inferring Sexual Interest from Behavioral Cues: Ef-
fects of Gender and Sexually Relevant Attitudes, 29 SEX ROLES 13, 32 (1993); Saal et al.,
supra note 164, at 263-76.
16 Gutek, Social-Sexual Behavior, supra note 165, at 44 (finding that sexual behavior
initiated by a woman was viewed more positively both by male targets and observants than
similar behavior initiated by a man); see Hendrix et al., supra note 165, at 248; Konrad &
Gutek, supra note 167, at 430 (finding in study that men were four times more likely than
women to be flattered by sexual overtures at work).
I'l See Baugh & Page, supra note 167, at 458-59. Studies in this vein were the basis
for the movement to adopt a "reasonable woman" standard in evaluating hostile environ-
ment claims. See Blumenthal, supra note 165, at 33 (describing use of studies in debate
over "reasonable woman" standard). The "reasonable woman" standard, adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), has neither been explicitly
adopted nor rejected by the Supreme Court. The Court has, however, on two occasions
stated that harassment must be viewed from the perspective of the victim, leaving courts
free to consider the individual victim's identity and perceptions. See Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (holding that the objective severity of har-
assment must be considered in light of "the social context in which particular behavior
occurs and is experienced by its target"); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993) (holding that harassment must be evaluated based on the totality of the circum-
stances, which includes consideration of victim's identity and context).
M~' Baugh & Page, supra note 167, at 452 ("[Wlomen in general have a lower threshold
for perceiving sexual harassment than do men.").
171 See Foulis & McCabe, supra note 165, at 775; Tricia S. Jones & Martin S. Rem-
land, Sources of Variability in Perceptions of and Responses to Sexual Harassment, 27 SEX
ROLES 121, 123 (1992) (noting studies that have found that the more severe the behavior,
the more likely raters are to perceive the situation as harassing).
171 See Barbara A. Gutek, How Subjective is Sexual Harassment? An Examination of
Rater Effects, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 461 (1995) [hereinafter Gutek,
Rater Effects] (claiming that factors "associated with gender," such as stereotypes, propen-
sity to harass, gender roles, and tolerance for harassment, can likely explain much of the
gender difference in perceptions of harassment).
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high on a "femininity" scale also showed greater tendencies to label be-
havior as sexual harassment, while men rating high on a "masculinity"
scale tended to label relatively few behaviors as harassing.'74 Likewise,
studies have shown perceptions of harassment to correlate inversely with
sexist attitudes. For example, those holding sexist beliefs are less likely
to define incidents as harassing than those not holding such beliefs.'7 5
One consequence of these different perceptions is that men, particu-
larly those rating high in terms of masculinity, have broader definitions of
acceptable social-sexual conduct and concomitantly narrower definitions of
sexual harassment. 76 It has thus been suggested that men who harass "are
carrying out behavior that they consider to be appropriate for their gender
role."'7 7 These gender-related gaps in perception are aggravated in the
sexual harassment context because the definition of prohibited conduct is
vague,"' and the subjective perception of the recipient trumps the intent
of the harasser.
79
Gender does not explain all differences in perception, however.
Studies also suggest that differences exist based on past exposure to in-
formation about or complaints of sexual harassment, which can be a
function of organizational background or time with a particular company. 8 °
These factors may look like gender differences, however, since women
are more likely to have had past negative experiences at work and there-
fore are more likely to rate sexual behavior as harassing. 8 ' Studies have
114 See Foulis & McCabe, supra note 165, at 776 (reporting on prior studies reaching
this conclusion); id. at 787 (reporting on authors' own study reaching same conclusion);
Powell, supra note 165, at 16 (finding a relationship between masculinity and an individ-
ual's definition of sexual harassment).
"I See Foulis & McCabe, supra note 165, at 777 (reporting on prior studies); id. at 787
(concluding based on authors' own study that gender role stereotypes were the "strongest
predictor of attitudes to sexual harassment").
176 Konrad & Gutek, supra note 167, at 436.
Foulis & McCabe, supra note 165, at 775; see also David E. Terpstra & Douglas D.
Baker, A Framework for the Study of Sexual Harassment, 7 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 17,
19 (1986).
178 See James E. Gruber, A Typology of Personal and Environmental Sexual Harass-
ment: Research and Policy Implications for the 1990s, 26 SEx ROLES 447 (1992) (noting
that the definition of sexual harassment is vague enough to permit different perceptions of
what is prohibited; such differences may then result in different interpretations of what
constitutes acceptable interpersonal behavior).
179 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993) (mandating that claims
be evaluated from the perspective of the victim); see also Williams v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
187 F.3d 553, 566 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that the intent of the harasser is irrelevant).
I8 See Konrad & Gutek, supra note 167, at 424-25; Aron Saperstein et al., Ideology or
Experience: A Study of Sexual Harassment, 32 SEx ROLES 835, 835-42 (1995).
"I See, e.g., Gerald L. Blakely et al., The Relationship Between Gender, Personal Ex-
perience, and Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 8 EMPLOYEE RESP. &
RTS. J. 263 (1995) (being a target of sexual harassment may affect perceptions of harassing
conduct); Konrad & Gutek, supra note 167, at 424 (noting a difference between men and
women when labeling behavior as sexual harassment, partially due to women's more fre-
quent negative sexual harassment experiences). But see Foulis & McCabe, supra note 165,
at 776 (finding, surprisingly, that experience with harassment varied inversely with per-
ceptions of harassment).
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also shown some variation in perceptions of harassment based on age, 82
job category,'83 and job context.'84
Researchers examined the interrelationship between perceptions, job
context, and gender in further depth. Their research tested the sex-role
spillover model developed by Barbara Gutek and Bruce Morasch." s5 This
model is predicated on the idea that "gender roles spill over into the
workplace and replace or compete with the expectations associated with
work-related roles."' 8 6 Female workers take on typically female personas,
and male workers, male personas. This role incorporation, in turn, might
affect perceptions of harassment. For example, the model hypothesizes
that "sex-role behaviors may be seen by employees as being more appro-
priate in traditional jobs as compared with integrated and nontraditional
jobs."'87 Thus, a woman in a traditionally female job may be more likely
to tolerate or expect sexual behavior from male workers, whereas a
woman in a nontraditional occupation might be inclined to define the
same behavior as harassing.
Several studies tested the sex-role spillover theory, and most found
at least some connection between perceptions of harassing behavior and
job context. Susan Sheffey and R. Scott Tindale, for example, found that
their participants "rated ambiguous behaviors as being more sexually
harassing, less appropriate, and less frequent in integrated and nontradi-
152 Studies suggest that younger individuals are more likely to tolerate harassing be-
havior than older ones. Bernice Lott et al., Sexual Assault and Harassment: A Campus
Community Case Study, 8 SIGNs 296, 313 (1982); see also Gutek, Rater Effects, supra note
173, at 461 (noting that age and gender are the two characteristics that "seem to predict
definition of sexual harassment"). It is not obvious why younger individuals would be
more tolerant of harassment, nor clear whether the noted effect is truly a function of age
or, instead, a result of the fact that younger study participants tend to be students while
older ones tend to be workers. See Gutek, Rater Effects, supra note 173, at 461; cf. Hen-
drix et al., supra note 165, at 247 (finding that full-time employees were more likely to
define various situations as sexual harassment than full-time students). But see Terpstra &
Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions, supra note 132, at 7 (finding that
working women and female students gave similar responses to hypothetical scenarios of
harassment).
8 One study, for example, hypothesized that perceptions of sexual harassment would
also differ based on job category; managers, for instance, having been the contact person
for complaints or the object of training, may be more likely to "perceive sociosexual be-
haviors at work as a more serious problem than would nonmanagement personnel." Baugh
& Page, supra note 167, at 454 (reviewing literature that supports this theory). They re-
ported that others have found perception differences based on job type, even though their
own study showed no significant effect. Id. at 459. But there are also studies that suggest
the opposite-that higher-ranking employees are "less likely than others to label behavior
as sexual harassment." See Gutek, Rater Effects, supra note 173, at 461.
184 See infra text accompanying notes 187-189.
8I See Barbara A. Gutek & Bruce Morasch, Sex-Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover and Sexual
Harassment of Women at Work, 38 J. Soc. IssuEs 55, 56 (1982) (proposing sex-role spill-
over model, which claims that harassment is the product of carrying over "gender-based
expectations for behavior that are irrelevant or inappropriate to work").
86 Susan Sheffey & R. Scott Tindale, Perceptions of Sexual Harassment in the Work-
place, 22 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1502, 1504 (1992) (describing Gutek & Morasch model).
87 Id. at 1506.
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tional settings as compared with traditional settings."' 8 The authors found
these results predictable, pursuant to the sex-role spillover model, in work-
places with less differentiation between sex roles and work roles. s9
There are thus a variety of individual factors that alone, or in con-
junction with the organizational factors discussed below, might contrib-
ute to the problem of sexual harassment.
2. Organizational Factors
Organizational factors also play a role in facilitating sexual harass-
ment, but the precise mechanisms that either allow harassment to flourish
or stifle it are difficult to identify. Most of the theories that tie organiza-
tional structure to the prevalence of harassment focus to some extent on
power differentials between perpetrator and victim, which, in turn, are
often issues of gender.
a. The Role of Power
Two basic theories identify power differentials between men and
women at work as the primary catalyst of sexual harassment. 90 First, or-
ganizational theorists propose that sexual harassment is "the result of
certain opportunity structures created by organizational climate, hierar-
chy, and specific authority relations."' 9 This, in turn, becomes a gendered
explanation, given the "prevailing organizational structure in our society,
in which most positions of authority are held by men, who often practice
their power and exploit their organizational positions for sexual profit."'92
Although this theory is supported by studies documenting the high
rate of harassment of women working in traditionally male occupa-
181Id. at 1514.
" " See id.
''See Jeannette N. Cleveland & Melinda E. Kerst, Sexual Harassment and Percep-
tions of Power: An Under-Articulated Relationship, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 42 (1993)
(cataloguing role of organizational, societal, and personal power in producing or enhancing
sexual harassment in the workplace).
"a' Tangri et al., supra note 148, at 34.
92 Azy Barak et al., An Empirical Test of the Role of Power Differential in Originating
Sexual Harassment, 17 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 497, 498 (1995) (citing Tangri et al.,
supra note 148); see also Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide
to the Literature, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 40 n.10 (1993) (describing Catharine Mac-
Kinnon's theory of sexual harassment as structuralist, stressing that "women are suscepti-
ble to harassment because of occupational segregation, a situation in which most women
occupy low status, low paying jobs and tend to be supervised by men"); Vicki Schultz,
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1749 (1990) (employing similar structuralist approach to analyzing sex inequality in the
workplace).
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tions,' 3 it is undermined by studies finding that the rate of supervisor
harassment is far outpaced by co-worker harassment.'94 It is also ques-
tioned by at least one empirical study that attempted to test the link be-
tween power and harassment.
A study of Israeli workers compared the overall rate of harassment
reported by working women in a traditional workplace environment to
that reported by women living on a kibbutz, arguably a more egalitarian
environment. The two groups reported almost identical rates of harass-
ment, leading the authors of the study to question the significance of the
role played by power differentials in producing harassment.) 5
A second power-based approach to explaining harassment is couched
as a sociocultural theory. Proponents suggest that gendered power differ-
entials-at the societal rather than the workplace level-produce harass-
ment in the workplace. Sexual harassment, according to this theory, is:
an abuse of the powerful over the powerless. Because of the pa-
triarchal structure of our society and culture, men (who are more
likely to be powerholders) are more likely than women to sexu-
ally harass. And women, who are more likely to be powerless,
are more likely than men to be sexually harassed.'96
Feminist theorists, drawing on the sociocultural approach, describe sex-
ual harassment as only "one manifestation of a pervasive cultural en-
forcement of gender inequality." ' 7
"3 See James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and Organizational
Policies on Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & Soc'Y 301, 314
(1998) [hereinafter Gruber, Women's Experiences] (finding that "[g]ender predominance is
an important predictor of both physical threat and sexual materials"); James E. Gruber, The
Sexual Harassment Experiences of Women in Nontraditional Jobs: Results from Cross-
National Research, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SEX AND POWER
IN THE WORKPLACE: A CONFERENCE TO PROMOTE WOMEN AND MEN WORKING PRODUC-
TIVELY TOGETHER 128 (1992); Edward LaFontaine & Leslie Tredeau, The Frequency,
Sources, and Correlates of Sexual Harassment Among Women in Traditional Male Occu-
pations, 31 SEX Rot ES 422, 441 (1986); Robert E. Niebuhr & Wiley R. Boyles, Sexual
Harassment of Military Personnel: An Examination of Power Differentials, 15 INT'L J.
INTERCULTURAL REL. 445 (1991).
"' Terri C. Fain & Douglas L. Anderton, Sexual Harassment: Organizational Context
and Diffuse Status, 22 SEX ROLES 291, 300 (1987) (concluding from empirical study that
sexual harassment is more likely to occur when the victim is not a supervisor); GUTEK,
SEX AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 122, at 65; see also supra note 12.
"'See Barak et al., supra note 192, at 510-11. Their findings lend more support to the
biological model, discussed above, and the sociocultural model, discussed below, since
those models emphasize characteristics shared by both groups of study participants. See id.
"' Stockdale, supra note 151, at 96; see also Barak et al., supra note 192, at 498 (de-
scribing harassment as "basically a product of norms, values, stereotypes, myths, and gen-
eral relevant expectations and beliefs that prevail in Western society, which generally de-
lineate male dominance over women").
"I Tangri et al., supra note 148, at 35; Barak et al., supra note 192, at 499 (describing
the "sexual harassment phenomenon chiefly as an exhibition of attempts of male domi-
nance to overpower females and emphasiz[ing] female subordination and even owner-
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The sociocultural approach focuses on the ways in which men are
socialized to exhibit "domineering sexual behaviors" and women are so-
cialized into complementary passive and acquiescent roles. 99 A variety of
data points reinforce this explanation for sexual harassment. The high
proportion of male harassers and female victims supports this model,'99
as does the prevalence of harassment in workplaces with a skewed sex-
ratio. 200 The typical non-assertive reaction of victims in response to har-
assment is also consistent with the sociocultural approach. 20 ' Likewise,
the reported economic consequences for female victims is consistent with
the model's theory that the "function of sexual harassment is to keep
women economically dependent and generally subordinate. '2 2
b. Work Environment Correlations
Power undoubtedly plays a significant role in workplace harassment,
but that knowledge offers little aid in predicting harassment-beyond the
prediction that most harassers will be men and most victims will be
women-and thus gives few clues about appropriate techniques for pre-
venting it. In terms of predictive value, studies showing correlations be-
tween harassment and certain types of organizational environments may
be more promising than theories about the causes of harassment. Studies
have noted the correlation between sexual harassment and several factors,
including the "visibility and contact in sex-integrated jobs; the sex ratio;
occupational norms; one's job function; and availability of grievance
procedures and job alternatives. 23
Workplace norms is a promising area of inquiry. Harassment tends to
occur more often in highly sexualized work environments, male-
dominated work environments, and work environments in which the em-
ployers exercise little or no control over behavior.21 Workplaces filled
with pornography, for example, tend to be hotbeds of harassment. 20 5
Studies have also found an inverse correlation between perceived equal
ship"); see also Nicholas Davidson, Feminism and Sexual Harassment, 28 Soc'v 39, 41
(1991) (describing feminist definition of sexual harassment by reference to the presump-
tion "that the man holds power with which he is able to coerce the woman [to submit to
sexual advances]").
"' See Tangri et al., supra note 148, at 40.
'9 See supra note 9.
201 See, e.g., USMSPB 1995, supra note 7.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 136-144.
2112 Tangri et al., supra note 148, at 41 ; see also infra text accompanying note 300.
213 Tangri et al., supra note 148, at 38-40 (predicting identity of victims and harassers,
and level of harassment, based on varying organizational factors).
21 See id. (explaining the role of local norms and employer control in fostering sexual
harassment).
2l See Beiner, Sex, Science and Social Knowledge, supra note 1, at 295-96 (describing
studies documenting this correlation).
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employment opportunity for women and the level of harassment. 21 The
presence of harassing role models may also trigger others, particularly
those who have a high LSH rating, to engage in sexually harassing be-
havior.2 7
More common today than work sites plastered with pin-ups or har-
assing higher-ups are workplaces in which there is simply a norm of em-
ployer tolerance or even subtle encouragement of harassing behavior.
211
Studies show a strong correlation between ratings of management effec-
tiveness in reacting to sexual harassment and the occurrence of harassing
behavior, suggesting that "norms set by local management importantly
contribute to the occurrence of sexual harassment. ' ' 21 1' If "top management
condones sexual harassment by ignoring it, discouraging complaints, or





An article by Elizabeth O'Hare and William O'Donohue suggests a
new, four-factor model for predicting and explaining sexual harass-
ment.21 ' This model hypothesizes that there are four requirements that
must be met in order for sexual harassment to occur: motivation (power,
control, or sexual attraction); overcoming internal inhibitions (fear of
reprisal or rejection); overcoming external inhibitions (organizational
variables like sex-ratio and sexist attitudes); and overcoming victim re-
sistance (job-status and sex role). 212 The authors tested this model em-
pirically, finding it to be a better predictor of sexual harassment than each
of the models discussed previously.2 They found the strongest risk fac-
tors for harassment were "a lack of knowledge about grievance proce-
dures for sexual harassment, an unprofessional atmosphere, and the ex-
istence of sexist attitudes in the workplace. 21
2% , See LaFontaine & Tredeau, supra note 193, at 441.
27 See John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Analysis of Sexual Harassment:
The Person/Situation Interaction, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 68, 78 (1993) (applying the
concept of "behavioral contagion" to sexual harassment).
255 See id. at 70 (concluding, based on survey data, that "sexual harassment seems to be
more likely to occur when local norms permit such behavior"); see also Juliano & Schwab,
supra note 9, at 567 (finding, based on study of published sexual harassment cases, that
only seven percent of them involved allegations of posters or pin-ups).
211 Pryor et al., supra note 207, at 73.
2I) d. at 80; see also Theresa M. Glomb et al., Structural Equation Models of Sexual
Harassment: Longitudinal Explorations and Cross-Sectional Generalizations, 84 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 14, 26 (1999) (finding a relationship between organizational tolerance and
sexual harassment).
211 Elizabeth A. O'Hare & William O'Donohue, Sexual Harassment: Identifying Risk
Factors, 27 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 561 (1998).
212 Id. at 565.
211 Id. at 574.
214 Id. at 576.
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B. The Effectiveness of Preventative Measures
The incentives described in Part I are calculated to prevent harass-
ment by indirectly targeting potential harassers. However, the question
remains whether these incentives actually work. As the above discussion
illustrates, an analysis of the causes of harassment does not reveal a
panacea for the problem. Instead, it suggests some theoretical connec-
tions between the causes of harassment. This Section explores those con-
nections and then examines empirical studies testing their strength.
1. Theoretical Connections
Research on individual proclivities, which finds that men are more
likely to harass than women and that masculine men are more likely to
harass than effeminate men, z"5 suggests that preventative efforts need to
target subgroups of workers.
Exploring misperceptions about what constitutes harassment is im-
portant to the extent that if they are a cause of harassment, correcting
them may become a cure.2 6 For example, the boundary differentiation
findings21 7 suggest that the key to reducing harassment may indeed be
education and training. If those findings are correct, then the focus
should be on teaching those who are misperceiving situations to perceive
them differently or, at the very least, teaching them to recognize that
their perceptions are not universally held. The research on the interplay
between perceptions and gender roles also suggests the need to focus on
sex stereotyping in general, since the spillover of these roles contributes
to the problem of harassment.
An analysis of organizational factors likewise points to possible ave-
nues for prevention. To the extent harassment is a function of the oppor-
tunity to abuse power, the best preventative measures may focus on re-
ducing opportunities for such abuse through greater screening and
monitoring of those holding positions of authority. This "organizational"
cause, however, is intertwined with the individual ones. For example,
men who score high on the LSH scale tend to engage in harassing be-
havior in situations where their motives might not be obvious.2"8 Work-
place structure, duties, and supervision thus affect individuals' likelihood
to harass, as do their individual proclivities.
2 15 Effeminacy in this context refers to behavior and characteristics that are not
stereotypically masculine, including dress, appearance, physical attributes and actions, and
verbal patterns.216 See Stockdale, supra note 151, at 94.
217 See supra notes 164-189 and accompanying text.
218 See Pryor, supra note 159, at 288.
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If harassment is a function of larger problems of gender dominance
in society, the proper preventative measures for individual employers are
less obvious. Significant changes to workplace structure, rather than the
simple addition of specific anti-harassment measures, are necessary. Oc-
cupational segregation, which is still a significant problem in the Ameri-
can workplace, may breed this form of gender dominance. Again, this
cause is also interrelated with individual ones because female perceptions
and tolerance of harassment vary with the extent to which the work envi-
ronment is male-dominated. 2 9 Thus, the same behavior may be regarded
as harassment in one environment, but not in another.
Some of these theoretical cures for harassment might be promising,
but empirical data is needed to see if they can be supported. For example,
while problems with boundary differentiation suggest education as a
cure, it is unclear whether individuals' perceptions can in fact be
changed. And if they can be changed, what is the best method to do so?
Likewise, information about individual proclivities suggests that training
should target likely harassers. What it does not tell us is whether likely
harassers can change, and what motivation might be necessary to induce
such a change. These are some of the questions addressed in the remain-
der of this Part.
2. The Effect of Policies and Procedures on Levels of Harassment
Human resource professionals have long reported that "their biggest
problem with the issue of sexual harassment is that the majority of em-
ployees are uncertain as to what constitutes sexual harassment. '2 ' The
logical implication is that differences in perception-whether based on
gender or other factors-may be neutralized or mitigated by training
about sexual harassment. 2 2 ' The enactment and dissemination of anti-
harassment policies is at least theoretically calculated to produce this
effect.
211 See supra notes 185-189 and accompanying text.
2211 Blakely et al., supra note 8, at 71 (citing J.J. Laabs, HR Puts its Sexual Harassment
Questions on the Line, 74 PERSONNEL J. 36 (1995)).
22! Baker et al., Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, supra note 166, at 410 ("Organiza-
tions may want to focus a portion of their training programs for new employees on sexual
harassment issues to help clarify differences in perceptions and forestall problems of sex-
ual harassment."); Douglas D. Baker et al., The Influence of Individual Characteristics and
Severity of Harassing Behavior on Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 22 SEx ROLES 305,
320 (1990) [hereinafter, Baker et al., Influence of Individual Characteristics] ("[O]rganiza-
tions may want to offer training programs illustrating a range of sexually harassing be-
haviors and the likely reactions to them .... Individuals' ability to more accurately predict
the negative reactions and consequences of sexually harassing behaviors may in turn re-
duce the likelihood of their occurrence."); Hendrix et al., supra note 165, at 248 ("By
making people more aware of what is sexual harassment, organizations may be better able
to eliminate or minimize any perceptual differences.").
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The law, as explained above, now essentially requires employers to
maintain anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures.2 22 There is
some survey data to support the effectiveness of establishing harassment
policies. For instance, the most recent study by the USMSPB found that
eighty percent of respondents "counted establishing and publicizing sex-
ual harassment policies among the most effective actions an organization
can take to reduce or prevent sexual harassment.2 23 (Although only sixty-
eight percent of the respondents in that same survey thought that anti-
harassment policies changed the way employees behaved toward one an-
other.2 4) However, survey data on the background level of harassment
undermines claims about the effectiveness of policies and procedures.
Since surveys began to track levels of harassment more than twenty years
ago, the number of employers enacting and disseminating anti-harassment
policies has grown exponentially while the underlying level of harass-
ment has gone unchanged. 225 This alone suggests the preventative power
of such devices is limited.
There is likewise some empirical data to support at least a limited
role for policies in preventing harassment. One study of female workers
in Canada found a statistically significant inverse correlation between
sexual harassment policies and procedures and the incidence of harass-
ment. Specifically, researchers found that informational measures such as
policies and posters were helpful in reducing less severe forms of envi-
ronmental harassment like sexual comments and pornographic posters. 226
However, these methods were not as effective in targeting more severe
forms of harassment, particularly incidents directed at specific individu-
als. For those, more proactive methods, signaling a true commitment by
the employer to actively influence the work environment, were neces-
sary.2 27 Previous researchers reached similar conclusions, finding that
"sexual harassment is curtailed only when an organization makes a con-
certed ... and highly visible effort to deal with the problem. 228
222 See supra text accompanying notes 34-40.
223 USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 41 (respondents noted the following measures, in
rank order, as among the "most effective an organization could take": establish and publi-
cize policies, provide training for employees, publicize potential penalties, publicize com-
plaint channels, protect victims from reprisal, provide training for supervisors, and enforce
strong penalties).
224 See id.
225 Since these surveys ask about actual experiences of employees rather than reported
incidents, the constant number cannot be explained as less harassment with more report-
ing. 226 Gruber, Women's Experiences, supra note 193, at 316.
221 See id. (finding that while informational methods are effective at preventing envi-
ronmental harassment, proactive methods like training are necessary to prevent harassment
targeted at individuals).
22 See id.; Pryor et al., supra note 207, at 68 (arguing that proactive measures have the
effect of changing perceptions and creating "local norms" that make harassment less ac-
ceptable).
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These studies give some support for mandating the adoption of anti-
harassment policies, but suggest that greater proactive measures are more
likely to be effective. One proposition that could be tested is why these
measures affect the rate of harassment, addressing, in particular, whether
potential harassers are deterred by learning of the possible sanctions for
violating an employer's anti-harassment policy.
3. The Effect of Training on Levels of Harassment
Anti-harassment training, which is encouraged but not required 22' by
Faragher and Ellerth, is a more promising tool of prevention than poli-
cies and procedures. The objectives of most training programs include
increasing knowledge and awareness about sexual harassment and, in
turn, changing attitudes and behavior about it. Theoretically, greater
awareness about sexual harassment should result in fewer harassing ac-
tions, particularly given the strength of the findings about the role of
misperceptions in causing harassing behavior. It was the perceived effec-
tiveness of training that led former EEOC chair Eleanor Holmes Norton
to claim that "[s]exual harassment has developed as one of the great les-
sons in how education can have an effect on an offensive practice. '23
Survey respondents share this optimism about the effectiveness of
training. According to one survey, sixty-three percent of respondents
thought training helps prevent sexual harassment to a "moderate or great
extent." Yet, at least one in five employees who had attended formal
training thought it had no effect on their attitudes or beliefs.2 1'
Researchers have only begun to focus on the efficacy of training in
the last decade or so. This focus flows from the observations of many
academics that training programs, though widely used, suffer from a lack
of validation of their effectiveness. This deficiency has been described
variously as an "unpleasant empirical truth," a "glaring omission[ ]," "both
unfortunate and somewhat unsettling," and "perhaps the most alarming
''232gap .
Today there is a small but growing body of studies that attempts to
evaluate the effect of anti-harassment training on perceptions, attitudes,
and beliefs about harassment, as well as its effect on behavior. Because
perceptions about harassment involving open threats or obvious links
221 See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. Training is, as discussed above,
mandated by some state laws. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. Federal agencies
are also required to offer anti-harassment training to their employees. See USMSPB 1995,
supra note 7, at 42.
239 Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, 13 WORKING WOMAN 69,
73 (1988).
211 USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 43.
232 Robert Moyer & Anjan Nath, Sexual Harassment Training Interventions, 28 J. AI'-
PLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 333, 334-35 (1998) (summarizing observations of other researchers
on the poor state of knowledge about the efficacy of anti-harassment training).
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between sexual submission and work-related benefits do not tend to vary
much, 23 3 these studies often focus on the effect of training in more am-
biguous situations involving sexual comments, gestures, and overtures.
Early studies looked at the effects of training interventions on par-
ticular working populations. One of the first studies examined the change
in attitudes of university residential advisors after exposure to training
materials. This population was targeted because the advisors were likely
to receive harassment complaints from residents and would be expected
to provide counseling or direction in response. 234 The participants com-
pleted an initial survey designed to measure their skill at identifying sex-
ual harassment before undergoing a two-hour training session. Two
weeks later, participants took a post-training test. 235 The study found that
male participants significantly increased their awareness about sexual
harassment, but that the effect on women was not statistically significant.2 36
A second study followed the implementation of a comprehensive
anti-harassment program, including a training component designed to
change attitudes and norms about harassment on a university campus.2 37
This study, which attempted to gauge the effectiveness of the training
program through a pre- and post-survey of participants' attitudes and
knowledge about sexual harassment, found evidence of a training effect.
Participants overwhelmingly responded that they had developed a
"greater understanding of the problem of sexual harassment, increased
their understanding of the nature of proscribed socio-sexual behaviors,
increased their awareness of [the university's] sexual harassment policy
and laws regarding sexual harassment, and made them better able to as-
sist victims of sexual harassment. '238 The attitude and belief surveys also
reflected other positive changes in most training participants, including a
lesser tendency to blame harassment victims, an increase in knowledge of
victim's rights, and a belief that the institution was "genuinely interested
in providing an environment free from sexual harassment. 239
A third early study examined the effect of a more than two-hour har-
assment training program on the attitudes of a large group of community
care workers in Illinois. 24 ' Based on this study, which was precipitated by
a concern about the number of reported incidents of harassment in this
233 See id. at 336 n.3.
211 See Kathleen Beauvais, Workshops to Combat Sexual Harassment: A Case Stud), of
Changing Attitudes, 12 SIGNS 130, 131 (1986).
215 Id. at 137.
231 See id. at 139-40.
231 Daniel A. Thomann et al., An Organizational Development Approach to Preventing
Sexual Harassment, 40 CUPA J. 34, 39 (1989).
239 Id.
231 Id. at 40.
240 See Sandra J. Maurizio & Janet L. Rogers, Sexual Harassment and Attitudes in Ru-
ral Community Care Workers, 16 HEALTiH VALUES 40, 41 (1992).
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population of workers, 24 the authors concluded that the training was "an
effective intervention," leading to greater understanding of the problem
of sexual harassment and strategies for preventing it. 242
Finally, a fourth study attempted to measure the effect of an inter-
vention to reduce gender insensitivity and sexual harassment at Stanford
Medical School.24 The authors utilized an annual survey about the inci-
dence of sexual harassment and other aspects of the work environment
following the introduction of mandatory sexual harassment and diversity
training along with other measures designed to change the culture. 244 In
that study, the authors found a reduction in the number of sexual harass-
ment incidents, though the overall number remained, in their assessment,
unacceptably high. They also found some improvements in the overall
climate. 245 Although this study has methodological limitations (such as
the lack of a control group) that make it difficult to conclude that the
changes resulted from the training, it provides some evidence of the ef-
fect of preventative measures in an actual workplace setting.
Newer studies have retreated to the laboratory, using college stu-
dents in heavily controlled experiments designed to test the effects of
training programs on potential harassers. Although methodologies vary,
the general thrust of training studies is an evaluation of attitudes toward
and perceptions of harassment before and after being exposed to some
kind of training materials. Recent studies have tried to cure some of the
limitations of earlier studies by introducing control groups against which
to measure reported improvements.
In a study by Gerard Blakely, Eleanor Blakely, and Robert Moor-
man, for example, researchers examined the effect of training on percep-
tions of harassment. 246 They hypothesized that individuals "exposed to
the topic of sexual harassment during training would perceive sexually
oriented work behavior as more sexually harassing than would individu-
als who had not received training about sexual harassment." '247 Partici-
pants in this study were asked to view a training video on sexual harass-
ment and participate in a classroom discussion about the film. 248 Six
241 Id.
242 Id. at 44. Specifically, participants were considerably more likely to agree after the
training intervention that wearing a professional uniform and behaving professionally were
likely to reduce the incidence of harassment. Id. at 42, 44.
241 See Charlotte D. Jacobs et al., Impact of a Program to Diminish Gender Insensitiv-
itv and Sexual Harassment at a Medical School, 75 ACAD. MEi. 464 (May 2000).
244 Id. at 465.
241 Id. at 467.
141 See Blakely et al., supra note 8, at 74.
247 Id.
248 Surveys suggest that videotapes are "the most commonly used instructional method
for organizational training, used by over ninety percent of surveyed organizations." Elissa
Perry et al., Individual Differences in the Effectiveness of Sexual Harassment Awareness
Training, 28 J. App. Soc. PsycH. 698, 699 (1998). Training videos typically define harass-
ment, give examples, and discuss some of the related legal issues. Id. at 700.
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weeks later, participants completed a questionnaire measuring percep-
tions of sexual harassment. A control group that had not viewed the
video or participated in the discussion then completed the same ques-
tionnaire. 249 The two groups were similar in terms of gender, age, work
experience, and familiarity with the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill sexual
harassment controversy. 20 The questionnaire described thirteen scenar-
ios, all involving sexual behavior, ranging from innocuous to ambiguous
to severe, initiated by a male supervisor toward a female subordinate.2 1'
The data, culled from the responses of the two groups of partici-
pants, gave at least partial support for the authors' hypothesis that train-
ing affects perceptions of sexual harassment. 2 2 The data showed that par-
ticipants who underwent training rated severe behavior as signifi-cantly
more harassing than the participants in the control group, but that train-
ing had a less significant effect on perceptions of ambiguous behavior,
and no effect on ratings of innocuous behavior.253
An additional finding of the study is that gender differences in per-
ception were reduced by training. In particular, faced with ambiguous
behavior, males were more likely to share the perception of females as to
whether the conduct was harassing after they had participated in the
training program.254 Drawing on other studies suggesting that individuals
who "perceive a behavior as harassing are less likely to engage in such a
behavior," the authors concluded that their findings provided support for
urging employers to adopt training programs in addition to policies. 25
A study by Robert Moyer and Anjan Nath focused more explicitly
on gender differences and the effects of training. One problem with ear-
lier studies, they noted, was that previous studies showing gender differ-
ence in perceptions were not measured against any baseline. Thus, they
argued, it is not clear whether "women see more sexual harassment be-
cause they are better at detecting it ... when it occurs," or whether
"women are sometimes 'seeing' sexual harassment when it isn't
there[ .j]256
The authors' solution to this problem was to compare the perceptions
of male and female participants, both trained and untrained, to an expert
standard. 257 The trained group watched an instructional video about sex-
ual harassment; the control group did not. Both groups were then given a
249 See Blakely et al., supra note 8, at 75.
251 See id. at 76.
211 See id. at 75.
251 See id. at 78-79.
213 See id. at 77.
294 See id. at 79.
255 Id.
256 Moyer & Nath, supra note 232, at 336.
217 Id. at 335. Moyer and Nath also criticize prior studies for failing to use control
groups, a problem they cure by looking at both trained and untrained lay persons to evalu-
ate perceptions of harassment.
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series of written scenarios and asked to determine whether sexual har-
assment had occurred. A panel of seven experts was also asked to evalu-
ate each written scenario under one state's law.
2
11
The authors drew two conclusions from the preliminary study. First,
they concluded that women's perceptions of harassment are more in line
with the experts.29 ' Second, they found that although "trained participants
were significantly better than untrained participants at detecting sexual
harassment when our experts said it occurred, they were also significantly
more likely than untrained participants to perceive sexual harassment
when our experts said it had not occurred. 12 ' Thus, training did enhance
perceptions of harassment, though it did not necessarily improve them.
The authors' main study involved separating participants into three
groups: no exposure, one-exposure, and three-exposures. The first group
received no materials; the second group received a poster about sexual
harassment that state law requires employers to post, as well as a written
anti-harassment policy; and the third group received the poster, the pol-
icy, and two written tests with immediate feedback. After exposure to the
designated materials, these groups were then asked to evaluate the same
written scenarios used in the preliminary study.2"'
This study showed evidence of a training effect as well. The three-
exposures group identified harassment more expertly than the one-
exposure group, and both were more expert than the control group. 21
2
Unlike the preliminary study, the change in perceptions resulting from
training was in fact an improvement: there was an increase in "hits" with
scenarios identified by experts as harassing without an offsetting increase
in false-positives. 2 The multiple exposures may have produced the im-
proved outcome over the preliminary study.
The study also concluded, however, that the training effect depended
on gender.2"4 The authors found that although untrained women perceive
harassment "more expertly" than untrained men,' 5 men were more likely
to "improve" based on training than women. 2 6 But the difference, the
authors claim, is not because women already knew everything the men
learned in training. To the contrary, they claim that men and women ac-
quire similar amounts of knowledge through training, but that despite
2' The study relied on the law of Maine, which is virtually indistinguishable from fed-
eral law and the law of most states on what conduct constitutes actionable sexual harass-
ment. Id. at 338.
2' /i. at 340.
21,1 Id. at 341.
212 Id. at 342.
263 Id. at 344.
See id. at 342.
1 Id. at 344.
21 Id. at 343.
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equal acquisition of knowledge, men's perceptions change more.267 Their
explanation for the perceptual improvement is that training causes men to
focus on the problem of sexual harassment more closely, which enables
them to assess the scenarios more accurately after they are trained. 268
Another study, conducted by Elissa Perry, Carol Kulik, and James
Schmidtke, attempted to measure the training effect on different types of
men. Using the rating system designed by Pryor,"' the authors coded
participants on the LSH scale. 270 They then conducted a study to measure
the effect of watching a commercially available sexual harassment train-
ing video on each of these groups, as compared to control groups. 21! This
study, unlike others previously discussed, attempted to measure not only
knowledge acquisition about harassment, but also whether viewing the
harassment training video had any effect on behavior. It looked for a be-
havioral effect by testing the participant's willingness to engage in inap-
propriate touching of a female associate. 2 2 The study participants first
watched a sexual harassment training video, then watched a golf video,
and finally attempted to teach a female associate how to putt. Observa-
tions of the golf lesson gave the researchers information on touching be-
havior and enabled them to compare the level of inappropriate touching
between trained and untrained men in an activity that requires, or at least
provides an opportunity for, some amount of touching. 273
The results of this study were mixed. The authors found that expo-
sure to the training video did improve knowledge and reduce inappropri-
ate touching for some participants, yet did not affect long-term attitudes
related to the propensity to harass. 274 A key finding of this study is that
training affects people differently. Individuals with a high LSH knew less
about harassment and engaged in more inappropriate touching without
training than those with a low LSH. The training reduced inappropriate
touching for the high LSH group but not the low LSH group. It had this
effect, apparently, without any change in attitude, as no participant
scored lower on the LSH scale after training than before. 27 ' This finding
suggests that training might be effective at changing behavior even if it
cannot change attitudes. It also suggests that training tailored to employ-
211 Id. at 344.
211 Id. The three limitations conceded by the authors are, first, that a different panel of
experts might have made different judgments; second, that their study does not test for
longevity of the effects reported; and, third, that their findings may not apply to percep-
tions of real-life harassment as opposed to written scenarios. See id. at 346-47.
26 See supra text accompanying notes 160-162.
271 The coding was done using Pryor's "LSH instrument" as well as a survey including
questions about sexual attitudes. See Perry et al., supra note 153, at 706.
271 See id. at 705-1 I (describing study design).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 7 16.
275 Id.
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ees' particular characteristics, something not done by most employers,
could be useful.276
Taken together, these later studies provide some empirical evidence
of a training effect; that is, exposure to sexual harassment training has
been found to make lay-persons perceptions of harassment more expert.
They also show that training can, under some circumstances, directly
affect behavior such as inappropriate touching. Men are more susceptible
to the training effect than women; high LSH individuals, more so than
low LSH individuals.
While this data is hopeful, there remains a significant gap between
these general findings and the conclusion that training will actually re-
duce harassment. Improved perceptions about written scenarios may or
may not translate into better perceptions about real-person interactions in
the workplace. 7 A better ability to perceive conduct as harassing may or
may not translate into a lesser likelihood of engaging in it. 27s There are
only a few studies making these connections, and fewer still replicating
these findings outside of a laboratory setting equipped with adequate sta-
tistical controls.2 71 It is also unclear from these studies whether the train-
ing effect is a lasting one, or whether improvements in perceptions dissi-
pate over time. 8 Researchers are also hesitant to generalize from the
findings based on studies involving college students to working adults.28 '
Training may also produce unwanted effects. Increased awareness of
what constitutes harassment and the potential consequences for engaging
in it may deter men from working with women, particularly in a supervi-
sory or mentoring relationship, for fear of being implicated in sexual har-
276 Specifically, the author suggests that trainers should measure the LSH of partici-
pants before a training program and then determine appropriate training methods based on
that information. See id. at 717-18; see also USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 45 (conclud-
ing, based on survey data, that "agencies need to consider several more tailored responses"
in addition to "policy, training, and complaint programs").
277 See Moyer & Nath, supra note 232, at 347 (questioning whether individuals who
learn to perceive harassment more expertly due to training may nonetheless have difficulty
perceiving it in real-life situations).
27 Id. There is perhaps a further weak link in the chain, suggested by Joann Keyton
and Steven Rhodes. Based on a study measuring participants ability to identify sexual
harassment, the authors conclude that there is little relation between empathy and the abil-
ity to properly label incidents as harassing. The cautionary tale, according to the authors, is
that training programs often rely on the "assumption that employees will be able to ex-
trapolate what they viewed or heard in training to their organizational interaction." Joann
Keyton & Steven C. Rhodes, Organizational Sexual Harassment: Translating Research
into Application, 27 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 158, 170 (1999). This assumption, they be-
lieve, is not warranted given the failure of their empathy- identification hypothesis. See id.
219 See infra text accompanying notes 284-285.
18" See Moyer & Nath, supra note 232, at 347 (noting that "delayed retention" tests
would be necessary to determine whether the effect of training is long-lived).
211 See Blakely et al., supra note 8, at 80 (noting the continued controversy resulting
from generalizing responses of college students to those of working men and women);
Perry et al., supra note 153, at 457 (noting similar concern about generalizing survey re-
sults to the workplace setting, particularly given research suggesting that younger workers
may be more receptive to awareness training than older workers).
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assment charges. 28 2 In addition, mandatory training, particularly the more
intense approach often termed "diversity training," may create resentment
among participating employees.
283
These studies make training a worthwhile subject of study and
probably a worthwhile pursuit for employers. In the end, however, if
training becomes universal and the level of harassment stays the same,
the potential suggested by these studies will have gone unfulfilled. As the
authors of one study cautioned, "[U]ntil education and training interven-
tions can be shown to actually reduce the incidence of sexual harassment,
it would be unwise to attach much practical significance to the present
line of inquiry.' 284 A significant gap in the literature is "methodologically
strong, empirical evaluations of existing policies, programs, and training
that purport to have an impact on sexual harassment. ' 28 Longitudinal
studies of existing programs, while difficult to effectuate, would bridge
some of this gap.
Social science tells us that current preventative efforts employers
take may help, but are not sufficient to effect a meaningful reduction in
the level of harassment. It should thus be incumbent on employers, ar-
gued in Part III, to find more successful approaches to prevention.
III. EVALUATING THE NEW REGIME: REDRESSING HARASSMENT
When preventative efforts fail, victims should be ensured adequate
compensation for harm, as remedying harm resulting from discrimination
is as important a goal under Title VII as preventing it. 8 6 The affirmative
defense also produces incentives for employers and victims that are re-
lated to this goal-namely, the adoption of internal grievance procedures
and penalties for victims who do not utilize them. This Part examines
whether the affirmative defense is likely to increase or decrease victims'
282 See Nina Burleigh & Stephanie B. Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harass-
ment in Law Firms, A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (Aug. 1989); Cynthia Fuchs-Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings
and Open Doors: Women's Advancement in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
291, 376-77 (1995). The obvious disadvantage to women of this type of behavior is rein-
forced by a strange line of decisions from both state and federal courts concluding that
when a man fires a woman to avoid making his wife jealous, for example, he has not com-
mitted sex discrimination. See, e.g., Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int'l, 86 F. Supp. 2d 377
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mittl v. N.Y. State Div. of Human Rights, 741 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002).
21 See Barbara A. Gutek, Sexual Harassment Policy Initiatives, in SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND TREATMENT (William O'Donohue ed., 1997), at 195.
284 Moyer & Nath, supra note 232, at 347.
281 John B. Pryor & Kathleen McKinney, Research on Sexual Harassment: Lingering
Issues and Future Directions, 17 BAsic & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 605, 609 (1995) (summariz-
ing the current state of research on sexual harassment).
286 See supra notes 145-146 and accompanying text; see also Grossman, supra note 5,
at 720-21 (criticizing the Supreme Court for minimizing Title Vil's compensatory purpose
in recent cases).
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likelihood of obtaining compensation for harassment, or otherwise affect
the validity or justness of the available remedial measures.
A. Identifying Competing Interests
The previous Part examined whether the proliferation of sexual har-
assment policies and training is likely to have any effect on the frequency
of sexual harassment by preventing such harassment before it occurs.
This involved a fairly straightforward empirical examination, because the
goal-reducing the incidence of harassment-neatly serves the interests
of all relevant parties. Once harassment occurs, however, the interests of
the parties diverge: employees become either victims or harassers, and
employers seek to avoid liability or other negative consequences flowing
from the harassment. 2'
7
In the face of harassment, the victim typically wants the harassment
to cease, the harm to be redressed, and normal working conditions to re-
sume. The accused harasser typically wants notice of the complaint, a
speedy and fair resolution of the complaint, the implementation of ade-
quate procedural safeguards to ensure vindication in the event of an un-
just accusation, and the restoration of normal working conditions. The
employer typically wants to minimize exposure to liability, reduce nega-
tive publicity or other adverse consequences of complaints, and restore
normal working conditions.
This Section will examine the competing interests of relevant parties
in resolving harassment disputes and will discuss which interests are
served by the remedial procedures established by Faragher and Ellerth.
B. The Employer's Duty To Respond
The current legal regime is predicated on the assumption that em-
ployers learn of harassment because the victim complains. This assump-
tion has been made into law by the second prong of the affirmative de-
fense, which penalizes a victim who fails to take advantage of available
corrective opportunities. If victims do not complain, they not only are
deprived of any immediate corrective measures in most cases (because
the employer may not learn of the problem), but also of compensation in
any resulting lawsuit. Typical sexual harassment victims, however, do not
file complaints with their employers, at least not immediately. This legal
regime is thus likely to minimize victim access to compensation, a prob-
2' This characterization of the relative interests involved is based in part on the
framework set out in Edward J. Costello, The Mediation Alternative in Sex Harassment
Cases, ARB. J. 16, 16-17 (Mar. 1992).
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lem compounded by the unforgiving approach courts have taken since
Faragher and Ellerth in defining "reasonable" victim behavior.
21
One problem with this approach is that it assumes victims, like em-
ployers, will respond to harassment by registering prompt internal com-
plaints about the harassing conduct, even though empirical research sug-
gests that response is unlikely. Research suggests that not only are vic-
tims unlikely to learn about the rules that place such a premium on filing
an internal complaint, 289 but also that even if they know of the rules, vic-
tims will be unlikely to conform their behavior.
2111
In evaluating the liability regime, it is thus important to examine
why victims do not complain and whether the post-Faragher/Ellerth legal
structure includes any measures likely to trigger an increase in victim
reporting.
1. Why Victims Tend Not To Report Harassment
Victims forego internal grievance mechanisms for a variety of rea-
sons, 29' including a desire to avoid the likely consequences of filing a
complaint.2 9 2 Victims fear retaliatory firing or other adverse actions that
will jeopardize their economic security.2 3 They also fear other forms of
retaliation 294 and ostracization by co-workers,29 1 which may create an even
2'1 See supra text accompanying notes 105-116.
2" See supra text accompanying note 117.
2
,'1 See supra text accompanying notes 123-125.
29, Fitzgerald et al., supra note 122, at 152-53 (cataloguing empirical studies of under-
reporting).
292 Denise H. Lach & Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs, Sociological Perspectives on Sexual
Harassment and Workplace Dispute Resolution, 42 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 102, 111 (1993)
(describing survey data about job consequences for filing sexual harassment complaints);
Jan Salisbury et al., Counseling Victims of Sexual Harassment, 23 PSYCHOTHERAPY 316,
319 (1986) (noting that the "occurrence of physical and mental symptoms is dramatically
higher [for those who file formal complaints] then [sic] for those who do not").
13 See, e.g., Ben Bursten, Psychiatric Injury in Women's Workplaces, 14 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 245, 248 (1986) ("[The] social fact that women need employment
that may not be abundantly available tends to create a willingness to tolerate persistently
abusive conditions of work.").
24 See, e.g., Teresa L. Butler & A. Michael Weber, Retaliation Lawsuits are Increasing
Rapidly, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at B5 (citing statistic that 22.5% of all EEOC charge-
processing is comprised of claims of retaliation); Mary P. Rowe, People Who Feel Har-
assed Need a Complaint System with Both Formal and Informal Options, 6 NEGOT. J. 161,
164 (1990) (estimating, based on personal experience as ombudsperson in sexual harass-
mient cases, that seventy-five percent of victims express serious concern about retaliatory
or adverse consequences for complaining).
291 See Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 282, at 51 (noting the difficulties of being a
"whistle-blower" and trying to remain collegial); Mary P. Koss, Changed Lives: The Psy-
chological Impact of Sexual Harassment, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON
CAMPUS 73, 81 (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990); Rowe, supra note 294, at 164 (noting that
sexual harassment victims worry about disapproval from co-workers and supervisors if
they complain); CULBERTSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 17 (finding that at least one-third of
sexual harassment victims reported undesirable changes to the work environment). But cf.
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more hostile working environment than they currently suffer, or more subtle
harms such as losing a mentor.2  Victims may also remain silent because
they blame themselves for the situation, 97 or because "Fc]alling attention
to offensive behavior reinforces stereotypes of women as victims.
298
Despite the case law, which often derides these fears as "general-
ized" or "baseless," 211 studies in fact demonstrate that women who report
sexual harassment often face adverse consequences.'... The question, then, is
whether any of the other measures taken by employers are likely to
minimize these consequences or otherwise contribute to an increase in
reporting. There is some incentive for employers to prevent retaliation,
since their attempt to do so may contribute to the affirmative defense.30'
However, ultimately failing in such an attempt does not preclude success-
ful proof of the defense.
2. Improving Victim Reporting Rates
Researchers have made some effort to develop predictive models of
reactions to harassment,7 2 although none of the models focus on the ef-
Natalie Dandekar, Contrasting Consequences: Bringing Charges of Sexual Harassment
Compared with Other Cases of Whistleblowing, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 151, 153 (1990) (sug-
gesting that sexual harassment complainants are often perceived favorably by co-workers
and suffer far less than other whistleblowers).
2 96 See Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 282, at 51 ("A lot of women won't object to
harassment because they're afraid of alienating their mentors.").
297 See id. at 48 ("In fact, one of the reasons women lawyers don't report harassment is
that they feel inadequate for not being able to cope with it on their own. They see it as a
character defect rather than a management problem."); cf. Bursten, supra note 293, at 248
("[Women] may not report the harassment because they feel powerless, demeaned, and
intimidated.").
218 See Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 282, at 48.
2
"9 See supra note 114.
"I" See, e.g., Salisbury et al., supra note 292, at 316 (noting, based on clinical observa-
tions of victims over a three-year period, that sexual harassment complainants face psy-
chological abuse, lower performance evaluations, shunning of co-workers, and withdrawal
of social support); David E. Terpstra & Susan E. Cook, Complaint Characteristics and
Reported Behaviors and Consequences Associated with Formal Sexual Harassment
Charges, 38 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 559 (1985) (reporting that a majority of women who
filed sexual harassment complaints were ultimately dismissed from their jobs); see also
Fitzgerald et al., supra note 135, at 122-23 (summarizing studies showing that victims
who report harassment often suffer adverse consequences); cf. Juliano & Schwab, supra
note 9, at 560 (finding that only eleven percent of plaintiffs in sexual harassment lawsuits
resulting in published opinions were still working for their employer at the time they filed
the suit).
" See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
1112 There is a parallel line of research relating to rape victims. See generally Shirley
Feldman-Summers & Jeanette Norris, Differences Between Rape Victims Who Report and
Those Who Do Not Report to a Public Agency, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 562 (1984);
Mary P. Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal, and Situational Charac-
teristics, 9 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193 (1985); Linda S. Williams, The Classic Rape: When
Do Victims Report?, 31 Soc. PRoBs. 459 (1984).
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fect of employer grievance procedures or corrective measures. Studies
suggest that the nature of a victim's reaction may depend on individual
factors such as gender,30 3 race,3°4 religiosity,3 5 class, 3°6 and personal as-
sertiveness. 07 The nature of the harassment also predicts reporting.3 8
In addition, the likelihood of reporting may be influenced by the or-
ganizational structure of the workplace. Past treatment of complaining
victims may be one factor,3°9 as may the gender balance in the work-
place.3"0 A study by Jane Adams-Roy and Julian Barling found that vic-
tims who had filed a formal harassment complaint in the past were less
likely to perceive the organization's policies as fair, and thus might be
" See Baker et al., Influence of Individual Characteristics, supra note 221, at 318.
The authors of this study also found that women are disproportionately more likely to re-
sist and report unwelcome physical contact or other physically threatening conduct than
other forms of harassment. Id.
Il See Linda Kalof et al., The Influence of Race and Gender on Student Self-Reports of
Sexual Harassment by College Professors, 15 GENDER & Soc'y 282, 296-97 (2001)
(finding that although female college students are harassed at similar levels regardless of
race, non-white women are less likely to label the experience as harassment and more "re-
luctant to report sexual harassment because of the potential loss of educational rewards or
norms").
"' Baker et al., Influence of Individual Characteristics, supra note 221, at 319 (finding
that victims with "high religiosity levels" are more likely to respond assertively, if indi-
rectly, to harassing behavior than others).
Il See Eileen Breshnahan, Putting Your Body on the Line: A Meditation on "Hostile
Environment" Sexual Harassment in Working-Class Perspective, 9 NAT'L WOMEN'S STUD.
Ass'N J. 64 (1997) (exploring, based on her subjection to harassment while working as a
letter-sorter for the United States Postal Service, the many reasons working class women
may not report harassment to management).
107 See Jane Adams-Roy & Julian Barling, Predicting the Decision to Confront or Re-
port Sexual Harassment, 19 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 329, 334 (1998). The authors found
that women with a high level of personal assertiveness were more likely to report harass-
ment. They found this result hopeful, on the theory that assertiveness is a behavior that can
be taught.
308 See, e.g., Baker et al., Influence of Individual Characteristics, supra note 221, at
319 (finding that women "may employ passive reactions to non-threatening socio-sexual
behaviors," but "may invoke more assertive reactions" to threatening behavior); Fitzgerald
et al., supra note 135, at 121 (reviewing studies showing that "explicit, repeated, and obvi-
ously harassing situations are more likely to elicit some form of assertion or a more formal
complaint"); Mary Sullivan & Deborah 1. Bybee, Female Students and Sexual Harassment:
What Factors Predict Reporting Behavior?, 50(2) J. NAT'L Ass'N WOMEN DEANS &
COUNS. 11, 14 (1987) (finding severity of conduct to be a significant predictor of report-
ing); Terpstra & Baker, The Identification and Classification of Reactions, supra note 132,
at 7 (finding that sexual harassment victims, predicting their own responses to harassment
based on hypothetical scenarios, were most likely to report physical harassment like rape
and assault).
"I See Patricia A. Gwartney-Gibbs & Denise H. Lach, Sociological Explanations for
Failure to Seek Sexual Harassment Remedies, 9 MEDIATION Q. 365, 371-72 (1992); see
also Sullivan & Bybee, supra note 308, at 14 (finding that subjects believe victims will be
more likely to report harassment if the victims perceived the reporting procedures to be
effective and felt they would be believed).
""l See Gwartney-Gibbs & Lach, supra note 309, at 370 (noting that the prevalence of
traditional authority relationships, in which men tend to be supervisors and women tend to
be subordinates, may affect women's likelihood of pursuing sexual harassment claims).
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less likely to report a future incident.3 ' That same study found no rela-
tionship between job tenure and likelihood of filing a formal complaint.3 2
The most interesting work in this area has been done by James Gru-
ber and Lars Bjorn, who have combined individual and organizational vari-
ables affecting response rates to develop a predictive model. The authors
drew on models used to predict targets of harassment to predict responses
to harassment.3 3 The authors analyzed the influence of sociocultural power,
organizational structure, and personal resources like self-esteem on re-
sponses to harassment, which they in turn categorized as either passive,
deflective, or assertive." 4
Based on interviews of 150 women working in unskilled jobs at an
auto plant, Gruber and Bjorn found that women holding "low sociocul-
tural power" (i.e., young, single, black, or uneducated women) were no
less likely to respond assertively to harassment than other women,3"5 but
that women with less "organizational power" (i.e., those who work in
male-dominated areas or those with low-skill or low-status jobs) tended
to respond more passively than other women.3"6 Finally, the authors found
that women characterized as having low self-esteem or "low life satisfac-
tion" responded less assertively than others.'
1 7
Putting all their data together, the authors found job skills and work-
area sex composition to be the two strongest determinants of victim re-
sponse, with personal resources ranking third. They thus concluded that
"the manner in which women handle sexual harassment is determined
primarily by their location in the organizational environment,"3 and that
"more integrated, less sexualized work environments would not only re-
sult in less harassment but would most likely encourage more assertive
responses to any sexual harassment which might occur."3 ' However, per-
sonal resources played some role. Gruber and Bjorn also concluded that
support groups for women in the workplace may indirectly contribute to
better reporting rates.32
These predictive models help explain patterns and variations in re-
sponse rates, but do not necessarily provide guidance for improving them
(beyond overcoming entrenched societal problems such as occupational
"Ii See Adams-Roy & Barling, supra note 307, at 334; see also Laurie A. Rudman et
al., Suffering in Silence: Procedural Justice Versus Gender Socialization Issues in Univer-
sity Sexual Harassment Grievance Procedures, 17 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 519, 534
(1995) (finding that victims who failed to report harassment are more likely to score high
on a "futility index" assessing the likely response to complaints).
112 See Adams-Roy & Barling, supra note 307, at 333.
lii See Gruber & Bjorn, Women's Responses, supra note 139, at 814.
314 See id. at 815-19 (describing study design).
315 See id. at 819.
311 See id. at 821.
317 See id. at 822.
318 Id.
"I Id. at 824.
121 See id.
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segregation and power disparities between men and women). To that end,
research examining what kind of training is effective for victims is nec-
essary. 2
One study conducted by Gruber and Michael Smith found that
"women responded more assertively to unwanted sexual attention when
the workplace implemented several means (e.g., policy, complaint proce-
dure, training) for dealing with harassment problems.""3 The policies and
procedures may signify the employer's control over "sexualized interac-
tion in the workplace," and lead victims to rely on the employer to en-
force appropriate professional roles.323 But as researchers in this area rec-
ognize, a more thorough analysis of employer intervention, beyond sim-
ply asking whether a particular workplace has a policy against sexual
harassment, is necessary.
One avenue to explore is whether women's failure to report harass-
ment is related to misperceptions about the definition of harassment and
its prohibition. One problem that has surfaced in the empirical studies is
that women, although generally more adept at identifying harassing be-
havior than men, have more difficulty with labeling conduct they them-
selves are experiencing as harassment.324 This inability to label their own
experiences as harassment reduces the likelihood of reporting a problem.
One study suggests some ways to circumvent, if not overcome, la-
beling difficulties. Linda Brooks and Annette Perot conducted a study
with the starting hypothesis that victims will not report a problem unless
they perceive the behavior as serious or offensive.325 In that study, based
on responses from female graduate students and faculty members at a
large university, the authors attempted to measure the variables that
32t Most empirical work evaluating the effects of training has focused on the effect on
potential harassers rather than victims. See supra text accompanying notes 229-276.
322 Gruber, Women's Experiences, supra note 193, at 316 (describing results of 1995
study). The 1995 study tested factors affecting the willingness of sexual harassment vic-
tims to complain. See James F. Gruber & Michael D. Smith, Women's Responses to Sexual
Harassment: A Multivariate Analysis, 17 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 543 (1995).
23 See Gruber & Smith, supra note 322, at 559.
324 See, e.g., Fitzgerald et al., supra note 122, at 171; see also Beiner, Sex, Science and
Social Knowledge, supra note 1, at 309 (discussing studies documenting self-labeling
difficulties). But cf. Mollie L. Jaschik & Bruce R. Fretz, Women's Perceptions and Label-
ing of Sexual Harassment, 25 SEX ROLES 19, 22 (1991) (finding that women are unlikely to
label behavior as "sexual harassment" without first being cued to the term).
325 Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot, Reporting Sexual Harassment: Exploring a Pre-
dictive Model, 15 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 31, 33 (1991). The authors preliminarily assumed
that the victim's labeling behavior as harassment was a necessary precursor to her report-
ing it, but they abandoned that hypothesis based on a review of the literature showing that
assumption to be unwarranted. Id. Labeling has also been shown to be unrelated to the
negative outcomes associated with sexual harassment; that is, victims of harassing behav-
ior suffer negative consequences whether or not they identify their experience as "sexual
harassment." See Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual Harassment, 84
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 399 (1999) (concluding that because negative outcomes "oc-
curred even in the absence of cognitive labeling," it must be "the fact of harassment and
not its label or appraisal as stressful that leads to outcomes" (emphasis in original)).
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might contribute to "perceived offensiveness" and to determine whether
offensiveness, in turn, predicted reporting.3 26 They found that perceived
offensiveness was indeed a significant predictor of reporting,327 and was
influenced by both feminist ideology and frequency of the harassing be-
havior.3 28 Based on these findings, the authors concluded that employers
could "facilitate more reporting if public policy statements and educa-
tional efforts encouraged potential victims to identify and affirm feelings
of offensiveness in response to inappropriate sexual behaviors .... -29
It may therefore be that improvements to existing policies and pro-
cedures create a more hospitable environment for reporting complaints.
According to research in this area, strong statements against harassment
found in many policies should affirm the offensiveness of such behavior
to victims. Formalized grievance procedures should make victims think
their complaints will not be futile. Strong proactive measures to prevent
harassment should generate more assertive responses from victims. Poli-
cies that include strong statements prohibiting retaliation and promising
confidentiality should influence reporting rates, since fear of adverse
consequences is a major cause of victims' failure to report. 3°
Survey results from the USMSPB, however, undercut these predic-
tions. The latest survey shows a reporting rate of only twelve percent,
despite the substantial efforts the federal government has made to dis-
seminate information about anti-harassment policies and grievance pro-
cedures, as well as its efforts to offer training for all employees."' It thus
appears that the vast proliferation of policies and procedures has not
drastically altered the complex set of economic, psychological, and behav-
ioral forces that keep most victims from reporting harassment.
The legal structure also gives insufficient incentives for employers to
make broader efforts, such as eliminating gender imbalance in the work-
place and maintaining tighter control over the work environment, both
measures that could potentially make victims more likely to report. Cur-
rently, the affirmative defense, coupled with the reality of victim report-
ing, translates into a strong likelihood that victims will continue to be
deprived of compensation for harassment.
33 2
321, Brooks & Perot, supra note 325, at 35.
327 See id. at 43.
321 Id. at 45. Other studies have shown similar results with respect to the frequency and
severity of conduct. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
329 Brooks & Perot, supra note 325, at 45.
33o As discussed below, problems endemic to internal investigations, such as breaches
of confidentiality and the presence of in-house bias, might undermine these potential im-
provements in reporting.
131 See USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 30.
112 Linda Hamilton Krieger has argued that this disconnect does not necessarily mili-
tate in favor of a different legal regime. Rather, she suggests, there is a normative question
whether victims ought to be able to recover damages in lawsuits when they have, for what-
ever reason, deprived the employer of the opportunity to remedy the situation internally.
See Krieger, supra note 131, at 194-95. The duty to complain is not, however, imposed on
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C. Outcomes for Reported Complaints
A second basis for evaluating the legal framework established by
Faragher and Ellerth is whether it enables complaints that are filed to be
resolved fairly, resulting in adequate redress of victims' harm. Internal
investigations are the centerpiece of the remedial approach endorsed by
the Supreme Court. In essence, the affirmative defense requires that sex-
ual harassment disputes be investigated and resolved internally before
proceeding to court. A victim who refuses to assist an internal investiga-
tion loses her Title VII claim,333 and an employer who fails to conduct
such an investigation loses all defenses to the claim of harassment. 34
Employers have equipped themselves to fulfill the requirement of internal
investigations, often relying on third-party investigators and alternative
dispute resolution to resolve claims. But internal investigations are far
from perfect. This Section evaluates these methods of resolving sexual
harassment disputes.
1. Internal Dispute Resolution
There are some common pitfalls in internal investigations that un-
dermine both their actual and perceived fairness and effectiveness.335 In-
vestigations may be evaluated by three different measures: procedural
justice (how the decision is made), interactional justice (how people are
treated by the employer during the course of the investigation), and dis-
tributive justice (whether the ultimate outcome is fair).336
The measure of both procedural and interactional justice in the sex-
ual harassment context can be considered a function of whether the in-
vestigative process encourages or discourages future complaints.33 Sev-
any other victims of discrimination. See Grossman, supra note 5, at 729-32 (pointing out
doctrinal inconsistencies in Supreme Court's rule that victims who fail to complain could
lose their cause of action entirely).
331 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (holding second prong of
affirmative defense turns on employee's availment of employer's internal grievance proce-
dures); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same); see also Scriv-
ener v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 169 F.3d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1999) (establishing that de-
fendant met second prong of affirmative defense where plaintiff misled investigation by
denying that harassment occurred); Speight v. Albano Cleaners, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 560,
564 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding defendant established affirmative defense where plaintiff
refused to identify harasser); see also supra note 109.
34 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (first prong of affirmative defense turns on employer's
reasonable efforts to investigate and correct harassment); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (same).
35 See Peter W. Dorfman et al., Investigations of Sexual Harassment Allegations: Le-
gal Means Fair-or Does It?, 39 HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. 33 (2000) (outlining best prac-
tices for harassment investigations).
336See id. at 34 (describing three basic measures of justice used in fields of manage-
ment and organizational theory).
131 See Rudman et al., supra note 311, at 534 (finding the perceived absence of proce-
dural justice to be a significant predictor of the failure to report harassment).
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eral problems that plague internal investigations tend to have a negative
effect on future complaints. First, the difficulty in maintaining
confidentiality is significant. Victims frequently identify the lack of
confidentiality as a justification for foregoing an internal grievance pro-
cedure.3" Their fears are likely justified given that even where the em-
ployer promises confidentiality, some employees will learn about the al-
legations legitimately as the investigation proceeds, either because they
are charged with completing the investigation or because they have in-
formation relevant to the charges;33 ' others, perhaps many others, will
learn about the allegations through the rumor mill. 40 Moreover, the em-
ployer's desire to complete a thorough investigation-necessary to ensure
fairness to the accused and to minimize liability for the employer-di-
rectly conflicts with the victim's desire for confidentiality.34" '
A second limitation on the effectiveness of an employer's internal
investigation is the perception of credibility. It is only natural for all par-
ties-the complainant, other employees, the accused, and outside agen-
cies-to view the internal fact-finding process with some measure of
suspicion since the employer may have self-interested motives in its han-
dling and resolution of a particular case.3 42
While perceived bias affects interactional justice, actual bias also af-
fects both procedural and distributive justice. Internal investigations are
unavoidably biased. At a minimum, the individual who handles the in-
vestigation for the employer will shift from a purportedly neutral fact-
finder during the internal proceeding to a key witness for the employer
should the complaint reach a court.343 Moreover, the fact that employers'
concerns about legal liability and the future harmony and productivity of
its workers are but two of the many factors that may actually or seem-
ingly influence an employer's investigation.
3 See supra notes 294-295.
3 See Costello, supra note 287, at 17 ("[N]o matter how stringent the 'confidentiality'
requirements are, some co-workers will learn about the complaint as part of their jobs.").
""See id. (describing the typical "culture" that results in breaches of confidentiality);
Jonathan Day, The Problem of Perceptions: Reasons For Outsourcing the Sexual Harass-
ment Investigation, EMP. REL. TODAY, Spring 2000, at 101, 103 ("Watercooler gossip, off-
hours phone calls, and E-mail chat are all fairly active around even a modestly secret alle-
gation.").
"I See Costello, supra note 287, at 18 ("There is also little question that, with each
passing day, the number of fellow employees who know about the complaint, and the level
of detail of their knowledge, will increase. Nothing so titillates the American imagination
as a controversy whose subject matter is sex.").
32 See id. ("Where the accused is a member of management, complainants are under-
standably suspicious about the bona fides of an investigation conducted by management or
under its direction. Both complainant and accused may fear a whitewash by the employer
to avoid unwelcome publicity."); Day, supra note 340, at 105 (describing a survey in which
ninety-two percent of the survey respondents said "employees perceive a management-
conducted investigation-any management-conducted investigation-as biased").
"I See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of
Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 L. & Soc'Y REv. 497, 506 (1993).
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In-house fact-finders may also be biased in defense of the institution,
as well as harbor their own prejudices and predispositions about the har-
asser and the victim.344 Various studies have explored other sources of
bias beyond simple prejudice in favor of the employer's interests-fact-
finders may also have predispositions about sexual harassment gener-
ally.345 Men, for example, tend to downplay sexual harassment as a prob-
lem and therefore take it less seriously. A study by Eliza Collins and
Timothy Blodgett found that male managers are less likely to label sce-
narios as sexual harassment and are surprised by laws and norms that
take it seriously. 4 6 Another study examined whether the sex of the deci-
sion maker makes a statistically significant difference on his or her
judgment of responsibility and appropriate discipline in a sexual harass-
ment case. Although the study found that women were slightly more
likely to "view the incident as sexual harassment, attribute greater de-
grees of responsibility to the alleged harasser and lesser degrees of re-
sponsibility to the victim, and consistently recommend more severe dis-
ciplinary action," the results were not statistically significant.34
Another study looked at whether the physical attractiveness or "pris-
tine 3 48 appearance of the complainant would affect whether she was per-
ceived as truthful or untruthful in her description of the sexually harass-
ing incident.3 49 In that study, the authors found that an unattractive
woman was "perceived as significantly less truthful" than an attractive
woman, but that a woman's "pristine" appearance had no effect on the
perceptions of her veracity.35
344 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1587 (1991) ("Partiality comes in many forms. In its most virulent form it re-
sults from prejudice in favor of or against a person because of his race, gender, sexual
orientation, disability, religion, or class."); see also id. at 1588-89 ("Even among well-
intentioned judges who try to be impartial, the twin dangers of unacknowledged perspec-
tive and unrecognized partiality are always present.").
141 Cf. Liza H. Gold, Addressing Bias in the Forensic Assessment of Sexual Harassment
Claims, 26 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 563, 563 (1998) (noting the problem of bias in the
forensic assessment by psychiatrists of sexual harassment claims, given the fact that most
people carry strong opinions about sexual harassment).
146 See C. Collins & T. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment: Some See It ... Some Won't,
1981 HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 80, 81-82, 92; Gutek et al., Social-Sexual Be-
havior, supra note 165, at 44 (finding that men may look at "stringent sexual harassment
guidelines" and "wonder what all the fuss is about").
347 Daniel A. Thomann & Richard L. Wiener, Physical and Psychological Causality as
Determinants of Culpability in Sexual Harassment Cases, 17 SEX ROLES 573, 589 (1987);
cf Hartnett et al., supra note 165, at 296-97 (finding that men and women agreed about
appropriate punishment for the harasser, but that both, surprisingly, rated the harasser more
favorably than the victim).
141The "pristine" model is attired with conservative dress, minimal make-up, and
clean, straight hair.
'19 See John S. Seiter & Deborah Dunn, Beauty and Believability in Sexual Harassment
Cases: Does Physical Attractiveness Affect Perceptions of Veracity and the Likelihood of
Being Harassed?, 17 CoMM. RES. REP. 203 (2000).
I" See id. at 206-07; see also Wilbur A. Castellow et al., Effects of Physical Attrac-
tiveness of the Plaintiff and Defendant in Sexual Harassment Judgments, 5 J. Soc. BEHAV.
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Perceptions about the fairness of in-house investigations may actu-
ally increase employer liability, because victims are more likely to resist
the findings and seek redress in court."'
Even neutral procedures may operate in a biased manner. For exam-
ple, if women are relatively powerless within a particular institution or
workplace, they may be more likely to suffer retaliation for filing a com-
plaint and thus more likely to prefer informal grievance procedures. 5 2
The in-house investigation may also alter the workplace dynamic in
a way that is particularly detrimental to women. Individuals who have been
sexually harassed may not feel comfortable with an in-house complaint
process.3 5 A victim-employee may feel further victimized by the alle-
giance of the fact-finding employee with the harassing employee. Employ-
ers have an incentive to design internal procedures that minimize "cost,
time, and harm to public image"-all goals that may cut against the vic-
tim's interests.3
54
Even in the absence of bias, internal investigations suffer from flaws
that make the attainment of distributive justice-a fair outcome-un-
likely. The latest USMSPB survey finds that some of the same problems
that dampen victim reporting also plague supervisors charged with in-
vestigating harassment complaints. They feel uncomfortable confronting
harassers and discussing sexual issues, and may avoid formal investiga-
tions and adverse findings because they do not want to cause long-term
career damage to the accused. 355
Human resource professionals recommend that personnel charged
with investigating harassment claims be specifically trained to identify
harassing behavior and to evaluate conflicting evidence,356 but such training
is seldom given.3 57 At least one study has shown a training effect for indi-
viduals responsible for receiving harassment complaints; after complet-
& PERSONALITY 547, 556 (1990) (finding that subjects were most likely to reach a "guilty"
judgment with an attractive plaintiff-unattractive defendant combination).
351 See Day, supra note 340, at 102 ("Employees are, a priori, suspicious of manage-
ment's conclusions and fairness. This being the case, they tend to fight or disbelieve the
findings, resist internal resolution attempts, and file countercharges-regardless of the
investigation's actual integrity.").
152 See Stephanie Riger, Gender Dilemmas in Sexual Harassment Policies and Proce-
dures, 46 J. AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N. 497, 500 (1991).
"I Cf. Grillo, supra note 344, at 1585 ("[A] person might not want to participate in
mediation because the timing is wrong. She might be willing to mediate in the future, but
might feel for the present too vulnerable, angry, hurt or fragile to use anything but a formal
process with built-in distancing mechanisms.").
I" Edelman et al., supra note 343, at 499.
35_ See USMSPB 1995, supra note 7, at 36-39. The studies showing that high-ranking
managers are less likely to define behavior as harassing may contribute to the inadequacy
of or delay in an employer's response. See Gutek, Rater Effects, supra note 173, at 460.
356 See, e.g., Mark L. Lengnick-Hall, Checking Out Sexual Harassment Claims, HR
MAG., Mar. 1992, at 77, 81. Employers are also counseled to monitor and review investi-
gations to ensure "consistency and fairness." Id.
"I See Dorfman et al., supra note 335, at 33.
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ing a training program, contact persons knew more about sexual harass-
ment and were better able to provide effective service to victims.358 Many
sources also recommend that two investigators be used in order to avoid a
biased or careless result. 59
The desire to avoid disrupting the work environment may further
undercut the employer's ability to handle internal investigations. An in-
ternal investigation demands involvement by several members of the
workplace: the individuals charged with investigating and imposing dis-
ciplinary action on the offender, the complainant, the accused, and any
witnesses or employees with relevant information. 3' The employer thus
has an incentive to minimize the length and invasiveness of the investi-
gation to avoid disruption.
Many of the problems faced by employers in investigating their own
employees may be solved by deferring to neutral third parties. 36 ' Outside
attorneys, consultants, and investigators may better protect confidentiality
and minimize disruption to the workplace. Although the cost may be
greater, many employers will be willing to absorb it in order to avoid
lawsuits. There is anecdotal evidence supporting a trend toward using
outside investigators.362
One potential obstacle to outsourcing investigations is the position
taken by the Federal Trade Commission that third parties who conduct
sexual harassment investigations constitute "consumer reporting agen-
cies" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).363 According to this
interpretation, an investigator must obtain prior consent from the harasser
as well as comply with various disclosure requirements.3 1 Such consent
" See Michelle C.D. Blaxall, The Development and Evaluation of a Sexual Harass-
ment Contact Person Training Package, 17 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 148, 158-59 (1993); see
also Beauvais, supra note 234, at 131 (studying the training effect on residential advisors
designated to receive complaints from students).
" See, e.g., Oh, supra note 82, at 228-29; see also Andrea Williams, AAA's Sexual
Harassment Claims Resolution Process, 20 COLO. LAW. 1217, 1218 (1993) (describing the
American Arbitration Association's Model Sexual Harassment Claims Resolution Process,
which recommends that each fact-finding team consist of one male and one female to bring
a "balanced perspective to the investigation"). At least one study has also found that fe-
male victims are more likely to report an incident of harassment to a woman than to a man.
See Sullivan & Bybee, supra note 308, at 14.
16o See Costello, supra note 287, at 17-18.
361 See Day, supra note 340, at 106 ("[l]f management considered all of the potentially
destructive effects of even a single sexual harassment case, the decision would almost cer-
tainly be to outsource its investigation to an impartial, disinterested, and professional third
party."); Susan Gardner & Kathryn Lewis, Sexual Harassment Investigations: A Portrait of
Contradictions, Soc'v FOR ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 2000, at 29, 33-34 (noting
problems with in-house investigations, including bias and the difficulty of maintaining
confidentiality, that make the use of outside investigators appealing).
362 See, e.g, Beverly Garofalo & Ana Marie Castle Bray, Applying the FCRA to Third-
Party Sexual Harassment Investigations, EMP. L. STRATEGIST, July 1999, at I (reporting
that "increasingly, companies have been turning to outside investigators and attorneys"
after receiving complaints of sexual harassment).
3 See id. (describing FTC opinion letter and industry reaction).1 4See id.; see also Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); Gardner &
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is rarely forthcoming, further frustrating employer investigations. Even
where the harasser consents, the disclosure requirements force the em-
ployer to compromise confidentiality, which has the potential to under-
mine victim reporting.' The FCRA also requires that the investigator dis-
close the name and unedited testimony of the complainant and witnesses
to the accused, which may contribute to greater incidence of retaliation.
To avoid these traps,3 6 employers may hesitate to make use of outside
investigators, despite the problems endemic to internal investigations.
Some of the problems cited above can be resolved by adopting a le-
gal standard that measures employer liability according to their actual
success in stopping harassment. Courts do look at the promptness and
effectiveness of an employer's response to complaints, although stopping
the harassment and preventing recurrence is not always the benchmark
used." ' A stricter standard for employers might spur better policies,
which, in turn, might reflect a manifest commitment to correcting har-
assment while minimizing disruption to the workplace.
Even if employers manage to satisfy all three measures of justice by
conducting internal investigations that are fair in process and outcome,
they may still be inconsistent with Title VII's overriding goal of prevent-
ing discrimination. Lauren Edelman, Howard Erlanger, and John Lande
studied internal dispute resolution (IDR) techniques for handling com-
plaints of discrimination to determine the extent to which they mimic
legal resolutions, avoid legal interference, or achieve legal ideals. One
concern, developed in organizational literature, is that employers have a
rational interest in resolving grievances without necessarily identifying
the problem as discrimination or reducing its occurrence." The authors
interviewed complaint handlers in ten organizations of different sizes and
purposes. Through those interviews, the authors developed a series of
conclusions about the nature of IDR in the context of discrimination.
First, the authors found that law plays a very small role in handling
complaints. "Although complaint handlers are concerned with avoiding
external complaints and litigation and are therefore attentive to what
courts would do in a given case, they tend to subsume legal goals under
Lewis, supra note 361, at 29 (discussing conflict between hiring neutral third parties to
conduct harassment investigations and the FCRA).
31 Gardner & Lewis, supra note 361, at 34.
3 Recent cases have rejected the FTC's interpretation of the FCRA, holding that
"certain reports investigating alleged workplace misconduct did not trigger the FCRA's
notice and consent requirements." Mark J. Biros & Christine D. Bachman, The Fair Credit
Reporting Act: Courts Seek to Remedy the "Catch 22," METRO. CORP. COUNS., Feb. 2002,
at 4.
367 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. The uncertainty about what the law
requires may actually, in this context, be more likely to produce hyper- rather than sub-
optimal responses from employers. Afraid of allowing a potential harasser to linger and
cause liability problems in the future, many employers have become quick to terminate
accused employees rather than impose a lesser measure of discipline.
" See Edelman et al., supra note 343, at 499-500.
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managerial goals."3 9 Smooth functioning of the organization, rather than
individual rights, takes center stage. Thus, as predicted, employers focus
on resolving the conflict, which often means treating it as an interper-
sonal dispute rather than discrimination.370 This approach can serve the
goal of procedural justice by making the victim feel that her complaint
has been handled fairly and effectively, but may not actually contribute to
a reduction in workplace discrimination.37
Second, the authors found that complaint handlers make little or no
attempt to adopt substantive legal standards in analyzing complaints, but
instead apply a general concept of fair treatment to all claims brought to
their attention.372 Fair treatment was not construed by most complaint
handlers in this study as requiring consistency with the law.373 Thus,
goals like gender equality become less important than they otherwise
might be in an administrative or judicial proceeding.374
Third, the authors found that complaint handlers tend to redefine
complaints of discrimination as managerial problems. Recasting com-
plaints in this way enables handlers to fix a problem without "labeling
and condemning discrimination where it does in fact exist."3 5 Although
this approach sometimes grants remedies to complainants where the formal
legal system would not (because a court would simply dismiss a claim
that did not qualify as discrimination), it also "undermine[s] the legal
right to nondiscrimination." '376 Internal processes that recast problems as
managerial difficulties fail to contribute to the development of a standard
for judging later cases.377 Moreover, the "therapeutic remedies" used to
resolve conflict may have the effect of convincing the complainant that
she in fact suffered no legal harm, when the judicial system would find to
the contrary. This is a classic example of an approach that creates proce-
dural justice without achieving Title VII's goal of preventing discrimina-
tion.
The flaws in internal claims processes identified by Edelman and her
colleagues are sufficiently serious to question the appropriateness of the
law's heavy reliance on them in the sexual harassment context. Even if
conducted fairly, which is hard to guarantee, these IDRs may have no
effect on the level of harassment, while systematically denying victims
both public vindication and compensation for harm.
3691 d. at 511.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 512.
372 Id. at 513.373 Id. at 514.374 Id. at 515.
175 Id. at 516. One caveat to this finding is that the authors found complaint handlers
"most likely to recognize discrimination in sexual harassment cases." Id. at 523.
37 Id. at 518.
377 Id. at 524.
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Has the new legal regime done anything to improve this bleak state
of internal affairs? Not much, although by making liability turn, at least
in part, on the adequacy of an employer's corrective measures, the Court
has increased the chances that claims will be resolved more efficiently
and effectively. But, as with the conclusions about the prevention of har-
assment, the effectiveness of these measures would be better reinforced
by a legal standard focusing on success rather than compliance.
2. Alternative Dispute Resolution
Given the problems associated with internal investigations and the
potential damages at stake, many employers have begun to offer or re-
quire alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in place of both internal in-
vestigations and subsequent administrative and judicial proceedings. A
rise in both voluntary378 and mandatory use of ADR to resolve sexual
harassment complaints is inevitable.37
Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, explicitly en-
courages parties to resolve employment disputes using alternative means
of dispute resolution (both arbitration, an adversarial process resulting in
a binding decision of an arbitrator, and mediation, a non-binding, conflict-
resolving process aided by a neutral third party)."' One potential advan-
tage of ADR for victims is that the EEOC, due to tremendous volume, is
not capable of processing all the charges filed, and therefore might not
litigate on the victim's behalf.' Mediation and arbitration thus provide
an opportunity to resolve claims without the expense of a full lawsuit.
The following Section discusses additional advantages and disadvantages
of ADR for victims in sexual harassment cases.
I" See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 47, at 31 (reporting on the adoption by PaineWeb-
ber of the Forum for Alternate Issue Resolution, a program offering several ADR options
to sexual harassment complainants); Miles L. Davies, Dispute -Resolution Program Could
Pay Jor Itself, DENVER POST, Sept. 13, 1998, at J23 (recommending, based on Faragher
and Ellerth, that employers institute ADR programs for employment related disputes).
"I Several articles comprehensively consider the use of ADR techniques in sexual har-
assment cases. See Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual Harass-
mient Disputes in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489 (1997) (advocating for greater
use of mediation in the context of sexual harassment); Costello, supra note 287, at 16;
Howard Gadlin, Careful Maneuvers: Mediating Sexual Harassment, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 139
(1991); Williams, supra note 359, at 1217.
35)Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991).
Before this Amendment, Title VII encouraged "conference, conciliation, and persuasion"
to accomplish the same task. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994).
31' See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Arbitration, Mediation, and Sexual Harassment, 5 Psy-
CHOL. PUB. POLiY & L. 693, 714-15 (1999).
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a. Mediation
Mediation has become popular in the sexual harassment context in
both public and private sector institutions. The EEOC has begun experi-
menting with mediation, offering complainants the option of mediating
their disputes.38
2
Advocates urge that the primary problems raised by in-house inves-
tigations may be avoided through mediation."' For example, mediation is
better able to accommodate participants' desire for confidentiality and flexi-
bility.38 4 In addition, concerns about in-house bias and confidentiality are
not as strong when an employer devolves control to an outside mediator.38
Likewise, mediation may handle grievances in a manner consonant with
the complainant's preferences to stop the harassment without fear of re-
taliation, achieve a successful resolution of an ambiguous situation,386
and educate the harasser. 83
To the extent mediation can preempt litigation by satisfying the
claimant's desires, it may also serve the interests of all parties by avoid-
ing the cost, delay, and exposure associated with lawsuits.3 8 A study of
the EEOC's mediation pilot program showed a fifty-two percent settlement
rate and benefits to complainants comparable to those obtained through liti-
gation. 89 It is difficult to evaluate mediation from a distributive justice
perspective because it is almost always conducted with complete privacy,
generates no published decision or outcome, and rarely garners any me-
dia interest.
3"2 See Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation
in Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (1999) (de-
scribing the EEOC's experiment with mediation). The American Arbitration Association
designed a Model Sexual Harassment Claims Resolution Process to be used by employers
in conjunction with their own anti-harassment policies and grievance procedures. Wil-
liams, supra note 359, at 1217 (describing model process).
"I See Costello, supra note 287, at 19-20 (assessing the relative costs and benefits of
sexual harassment investigations conducted by employers, administrative agencies, courts,
and outside mediators, and concluding that resolution in the context of mediation is clearly
superior for many people given the interests of all parties involved); see also FitzGibbon,
supra note 381, at 715-19 (describing the benefits of mediating sexual harassment claims).
"I See, e.g., Linda Stamato, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Is Mediation an Ap-
propriate Forum?, 10 MEDIATION Q. 167, 168 (1992); Harkavy, supra note 382, at 158.
"I See FitzGibbon, supra note 381, at 718 (praising the "privacy and confidentiality of
the mediation process" for sexual harassment disputes).
116 Mediation also allows the parties to reach a resolution without making "a credibility
determination, which could be damaging to one or both parties." Id.
"I See, e.g., Gadlin, supra note 379, at 139; Harkavy, supra note 382, at 158; Barbara
J. Gazeley, Venus, Mars, and the Law: On Mediation of Sexual Harassment Cases, 33
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 605, 633 (1997); FitzGibbon, supra note 381, at 718 (noting that
mediation may be "particularly suitable to resolve disputes in which the parties have an
ongoing relationship").
"'See, e.g., FitzGibbon, supra note 381, at 717; Harkavy, supra note 382, at 159;
Stamato, supra note 384, at 168.
"I See FitzGibbon, supra note 381, at 715.
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Although some feminists support the use of mediation as an empow-
ering and equality-gaining process,"" others believe that informal proc-
esses such as mediation are likely to be infused with bias and prejudice.39" '
Mediators ... exert a great deal of power. When two people are
in conflict, having a third, purportedly neutral person take the
viewpoint of one or the other results in a palpable shift of power
to the party with whom the mediator agrees .... The power of
the mediator is not always openly acknowledged but is hidden
beneath protestations that the process belongs to the parties....
There is much room for, but little acknowledgment of, the pos-
sibility of the mediator's exhibiting partiality or imposing a hid-
den agenda on the parties.392
Mediation may also perpetuate the imbalance of power between the har-
asser and the victim, or be inappropriate because the less powerful party
"cannot negotiate on an equal basis." '393 It is perhaps only through a proc-
ess that involves fact-finding, such as litigation or arbitration, that the
parties may be equal."94
Mediation may have further drawbacks unique to women, some
growing out of the fact that it does not center on the assertion of rights.395
A rights-based approach, as Elizabeth Schneider has argued, may "link[ I
the individual to a broader social group, helping to transcend the dichot-
omy of individual and community." '396 The "assertion of rights can be
transformative for many women ... ""'
Even if mediation is successful in resolving a particular problem of
harassment, it precludes the development of coherent, relevant law and
provides no public vindication for the victim. 98 A quiet resolution may
insufficiently deter the employer from permitting future incidents to oc-
cur or the harasser from harassing again.399 The requirement that a sexual
" See, e.g., Gazeley, supra note 387, at 633; Harkavy, supra note 382, at 160-61; Sta-
mato, supra note 384, at 169.
i" Grillo, supra note 344, at 1589-90 ("The informal nature of the mediation setting
may make it an environment in which prejudices can flourish.").
392 Id. at 1585-86.
See Mori Irvine, Mediation: Is It Appropriate for Sexual Harassment Grievances?,
9 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 27, 36 (1993); Gazeley, supra note 387, at 633; cf. Gadlin,
supra note 379, at 150 (recommending modified mediation procedures to "deal with the
problem of power imbalances").
34 See Irvine, supra note 393, at 37.
"I "[T]he assertion of rights can help women distinguish self from other, and ulti-
mately give them a sense of collective identity." Grillo, supra note 344, at 1566-67 (quot-
ing Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from The
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 623-48 (1986)).
396 Schneider, supra note 395, at 617-18.
117 See Grillo, supra note 344, at 1567 (drawing on Carol Gilligan's work).
3 I See Harkavy, supra note 382, at 161-62.
39 See Irvine, supra note 393, at 51 ("Mediation would leave doubts in the work force
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harassment victim participate in mediation, which is suggestive of prob-
lem-solving rather than remediation, may also change her perception of
herself from a victim to a co-equal party to a conflict.4"
b. Arbitration
Observers can also expect an increase in the number of employers
who attempt to require or encourage arbitration of sexual harassment claims
as well,4"1 although arbitration is not nearly as prevalent as mediation.41 2
Arbitration does not seem to offer any clear benefits over litigation, since it
may be just as costly, adversarial, and time-consuming.4"3
Several studies of published arbitration cases have been done, most
involving challenges by a disciplined employee (usually the harasser)
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. According to one such
study of 122 published arbitration awards in sexual harassment cases,
arbitrators tend to be aware of judicial approaches to cases and attempt to
mirror them."' The study examined cases challenging the imposition of a
penalty on the harasser based on the terms of collective bargaining
agreements, and noted the influence of court decisions vacating arbitra-
tion awards on public policy grounds where the penalties imposed were
deemed too lenient.4 5 Following the issuance of a cluster of decisions
vacating arbitral awards, the study found that arbitrators became much
more reticent to overturn findings of just cause for discipline.40 6
as to what conduct is permitted," unlike arbitration or litigation).
""See Riger, supra note 352, at 502; see also Irvine, supra note 393, at 51 ("Victims
of sexual harassment must know that their harassers will be punished and that they will not
be prodded to minimize their abuse in the guise of mediation and reconciliation"). But cf
Stamato, supra note 384, at 169 (praising mediation because it "affords each party an op-
portunity to see the other's perspective without having to agree with it, and presumably to
reach an agreement that satisfies future needs and interests").
" The enforceability of mandatory arbitration agreements has been at the center of a
long and convoluted debate among federal courts. Current law suggests that pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims are probably not enforceable if made through a
collective bargaining agreement, see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-60
(1974), but enforceable if agreed to individually, see EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279
(2002).4
0
2 See FitzGibbon, supra note 381, at 719 (noting that U.S. General Accounting Office
study found only nineteen percent of employers with more than one hundred employees
utilize arbitration to resolve workplace discrimination complaints, while eighty percent
utilize mediation); cf. Williams, supra note 359, at 1219 (recommending, as part of the
American Arbitration Association's Model Sexual Harassment Claims Resolution Process,
that arbitration be used only after mediation has failed).
411 See, e.g., Harkavy, supra note 382, at 154 (claiming that "arbitration does not mate-
rially save time or expense in prosecuting civil cases, and the parties' satisfaction with this
ADR device ... does not appear to be so high as to outweigh its uncertainties").
"I See Donald J. Petersen, Issues and Standards in Arbitral Approaches to Sexual
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Another study attempted to measure the influence of Title VII on la-
bor arbitration decisions growing out of sexual harassment charges. In this
study of 132 arbitral awards, the authors concluded that external law
influenced many decisions, but was completely ignored in others.411 1 Inter-
estingly, unions fared better in the decisions where external law was not
mentioned, suggesting that arbitrators who do take law into account take
the obligations of employers to prevent and correct harassment seriously."'
Several studies have tried to develop a predictive model for arbi-
trated sexual harassment cases. These studies tend to show that the same
factors dictate outcomes both in arbitrations and litigation. Based on a
review of eighty-six published arbitrations, the author of one study con-
cluded that three factors were associated with discharge of the offender:
witnesses, the victim's filing a complaint, and other EEOC claims filed
against the employer.4" '
An earlier study, using a similar methodology, found that arbitrators
upheld discharge as a remedy when the harasser had been warned, when
the conduct continued over a significant period of time, when the of-
fender had an otherwise imperfect work record, and when the harassment
was severe. 4" Another study found that while discharge is almost always
upheld for cases involving physical contact, it is rarely upheld without
clear evidence that the offender knew or should have known of the rules
prohibiting sexual harassment."'
These studies suggest that arbitrators rely on factors similar to judges
and juries in determining whether sexual harassment occurred (and thus
whether the discipline imposed on the union workers was supported by
just cause).
Although relatively few arbitrations involve claims brought by vic-
tims, at least one study has suggested that they do not fare well before
arbitrators.4"2 It also found that arbitrators are particularly hesitant to up-
hold claims arising out of consensual relationships."'
Regardless of the case outcomes, arbitration may inhere fewer proc-
ess dangers than mediation because of its similarities to litigation.4 4 It
4o7 See Helen Elkiss, And the Winner Is... ? External Law and Its Influence on Arbi-
tration of Sexual Harassment Grievances, 7(2) J. INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTS. 149, 155 (1998-
99).
408 See id.
401 See Helen LaVan, Decisional Model for Predicting Outcomes of Arbitrated Sexual
Harassment Disputes, 1993 LABOR L.J. 230, 235 (1993).
Ill See Jonathan S. Monat & Angel Gomez, Decisional Standards Used by Arbitrators
in Sexual Harassment Cases, 1986 LABOR L.J. 712, 714-17 (1986).
4" William A. Nowlin, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Rule, 43
ARB. J. 31, 39 (1988).
412 See id. at 40.
113 See id.
4 See Irvine, supra note 393, at 50; cf. Sharon L. Oswald & Steven B. Caudill, Ex-
perimental Evidence of Gender Effects in Arbitration Decisions, 4 EMPLOYEE RESP. & R'rs.
J. 271, 276 (1991).
[Vol. 26
Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law
may also serve the victim's interest in vindication if the process is made
public. A panel of arbitrators recently awarded $3.2 million to a female
stockbroker for sexual harassment she experienced while working in the
infamous "Boom-Boom Room" at Salomon Smith Barney, the first of
hundreds of women likely to go before the same panel. The plaintiffs
who have already brought suit were given the choice of accepting a fixed
settlement or proving their claims before arbitrators in a public forum.45
Based on the available studies, it is hard to draw a firm conclusion
about the relative merits of ADR in the sexual harassment context. To
ensure adequate compensation for victims, arbitration should be pre-
ferred over mediation (the opposite of the current hierarchy), but only
used in lieu of litigation on a voluntary basis. Unfortunately, employers
have no incentive to design claims resolution processes to meet this goal
as long as they can assemble proof of adequate "corrective measures" for
purposes of the affirmative defense.
c. Judicial Dispute Resolution
One final empirical question is whether victims who litigate their
claims will fare better or worse than they did before Faragher and El-
lerth. Before these decisions, David Terpstra and Douglas Baker ran a
regression analysis of sexual harassment cases in federal court to identify
case variables that were related to outcomes. In that study, the authors
found five significant variables: severity of harassing behavior, presence
of witnesses, notice to management of conduct, availability of supporting
documents, and whether the employer took investigative or remedial ac-
tion.416 Another study found that type of harassment, reaction of the vic-
tim, and presence of coercion explained the decisions of most federal
judges in sexual harassment cases.4"7 These variables obviously overlap
to a significant degree with the factors courts are supposed to consider
when applying the affirmative defense. It may be that outcomes will not
415 Alan J. Wax, Grumman Parcel Up for Sale, NEWSDAY, Dec. 23, 2002, at 49 (de-
scribing settlement).
416 David E. Terpstra & Douglas D. Baker, Outcomes of Federal Court Decisions on
Sexual Harassment, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 181, 187-88 (1992); David E. Terpstra, The Proc-
ess and Outcomes of Sexual Harassment Claims, 1993 LABOR L.J. 632, 634-35 (1993)
(finding, based on a study of EEOC charges, that cases were "significantly more likely to
be resolved in favor of the complainants when the harassment behaviors were of a more
serious nature, when the complainants had witnesses to support their allegations, and when
they had given notice to management prior to filing formal charges"); see also Gowan &
Zimmerman, supra note 165, at 613 (finding, in a study designed to assess juror reactions
to sexual harassment cases, that those "individuals who had been victims of sexual har-
assment were more likely to award higher monetary damages, regardless of the severity
level of the scenarios, than were individuals who had not been sexually harassed").
47 Kenneth M. York, A Policy Capturing Analysis of Federal District and Appellate
Court Sexual Harassment Cases, 5 EMPLOYEE RESP. & RTS. J. 173, 181-82 (1992).
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vary tremendously under the newly articulated legal standard, in light of
the fact that courts were already basing decisions on similar variables.
A third study, looking at published decisions over a twelve-year pe-
riod, found the most successful plaintiff to be one who "alleged conduct
directed specifically at her by both supervisors and coworkers and com-
plained within the organization in some manner about the conduct."4 t Based
on a regression analysis, the authors of this study found several factors to
be predictive of plaintiff success, including an allegation of physical har-
assment, harassment involving supervisors, objection by plaintiff to the har-
assment, and the lack of policies and procedures specific to sexual har-
assment." 9
There have been very few studies looking at outcomes since Faragher
and Ellerth, but those few support concern about encouraging compliance
rather than prevention. One study, which analyzed federal court decisions
in the first eighteen months following Faragher and Ellerth, concluded
that "employers attempting to limit their liability should exercise reason-
able care, but not too much care because employers can be punished when
employees feel comfortable enough to use the procedures.""42 ' The study
revealed that employers who gamed the system in this way-by aiming
precisely at rule compliance but no higher-fared the best in litigation.
CONCLUSION
The rules of liability for sexual and other forms of harassment have
created an elaborate scheme of incentives. Employers must attempt to
prevent harassment by enacting anti-harassment policies and communi-
cating them to their work force. They must also attempt to remedy har-
assment with prompt and effective internal investigations. Victims must
file prompt, internal complaints when harassment occurs. In litigation,
response to these incentives is cause for reward, while failure to respond
is cause for penalty. Thus, rule compliance has become the benchmark by
which employers and victims are measured.42'
However, social science literature suggests that a near-perfect state
of rule compliance can peaceably co-exist with an uncomfortably high
level of harassment. The problem is that the rules of liability were devel-
oped in a vacuum, without consideration of the real-world problem of
harassment and its causes. While some of the preventative efforts encour-
" See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 9, at 570. The study also found that "[bllue-
collar and clerical workers were more successful than management, white-collar, or pro-
fessional employees," in lawsuits, and "plaintiffs in sex-segregated workplaces fared better
than those in integrated workplaces." Id.
419 Id. at 571.
421) David Sherwyn et al., supra note 56, at 1294.
421 Susan Bisom-Rapp has described this problem with respect to anti-discrimination
law generally as "masking rather than eliminating workplace bias." Bisom-Rapp, Bullet-
proofing the Workplace, supra note 76, at 1037.
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aged by the law may have the incidental effect of reducing harassment,
the same is not true of all of them. In fact, the only measure with any
proven ability to affect the level of harassment-anti-harassment train-
ing-is encouraged, but not required by the law. Even there, the type of
training that satisfies any legal duty may not be the same type that works.
Those measures that are considered legally sufficient have little evidence
to support their effectiveness.
The same criticism holds for legally required corrective measures.
The requirement that victims complain immediately upon experiencing
unwelcome sexual conduct does not account for the reality that very few
report, nor is it accompanied by any measures to improve the level of
reporting. Moreover, the emphasis on internal investigations is made
without consideration of the problems endemic to them. The responses of
the typical employer (who will likely respond to the incentives given)
and the typical victim (who will not) create no assurance that harassment
will be addressed, either in terms of prevention or correction. Both sets
of rules overlook the significant control employers exercise over the
workplace and their ability to establish norms of respect and equality, to
respond to problems in a manner that both resolves them and encourages
future victims to come forward, and to discipline offenders.
The reevaluation of the current legal regime dictates both doctrinal
reform and extralegal efforts. Three doctrinal changes can take the focus
away from rule compliance and toward effective prevention and adequate
compensation: elimination of the affirmative defense, greater availability
of punitive damages, and the recognition of individual liability.42 2 The
affirmative defense is doctrinally unjustifiable for a variety of reasons. It
thwarts Title VII's stated purposes, misallocates risk to victims rather
than employers, deprives victims of attorneys' fees that make civil rights
enforcement possible, and is inconsistent with the treatment of other vic-
tims of discrimination.4 23 The lessons learned from social science about
employer, harasser, and victim behavior countenance its elimination as
well.
Research suggests that the affirmative defense rewards compliance
without ensuring success. A rule of automatic liability, without such a
defense, will produce the same set of incentives for employers to combat
harassment, but will reward them only if their actions work. Such an ap-
proach will induce employers not only to take their preventative and cor-
rective efforts seriously, but also to adapt standard measures to idiosyn-
cratic problems they may face and to take additional measures to estab-
lish workplace norms that are inhospitable to harassment. They may also
422 Because the Supreme Court has established the affirmative defense, and every fed-
eral appellate court has agreed that the text of Title VII does not support individual liabil-
ity, both of these recommended changes would require Congressional action.
423 See Grossman, supra note 5, at 720-35.
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be spurred to evaluate the efficacy of the measures they do adopt-
something rarely done-and to continue to experiment with potentially
more effective strategies.
This approach will not garner support from most commentators,
many of whom have either praised the affirmative defense as a fair and
appropriate interpretation of Title VII or have criticized it for imposing
too much liability on employers. The bulk of this commentary has been
critical of the second prong of the affirmative defense,424 which makes the
employer's liability turn on the independent actions of the victim. The
possibility exists that even if the employer has acted reasonably in its
preventive and corrective measures, it may nonetheless be held liable for
harassment if the victim files a prompt complaint.42 That strikes many as
unfair,426 including several courts that have simply refused to apply the
second prong of the affirmative defense for fear of "punishing" an em-
ployer who has, in their view, done nothing wrong. 42
This concern, however, is overstated and, in any event, both descrip-
tively and normatively unjustified. It is unlikely that an employer who
has done "nothing wrong" will be sanctioned, because employer liability
accrues only when actionable harassment occurs. An employer who re-
sponds quickly and adequately to a victim's complaint of harassment is
likely to prevent the harassment from rising to that level and thus avoid
liability for the initial harassment. 21 Only when an initial act of harass-
ment is so severe as to independently create a hostile environment prior
to a victim's prompt complaint will an employer be held liable despite its
"reasonable" conduct.4 29
Moreover, an empirical study of federal court decisions in the first
eighteen months following Faragher and Ellerth revealed that employer
behavior heavily influenced not only the first prong of the affirmative
424 Early on, commentators criticized the affirmative defense because they feared it
would preclude the granting of summary judgment. See, e.g., Francis Achampong, Em-
ployer Liability for Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor: A Critical
Assessment of the Supreme Court's New Vicarious Liability Standard, 28 Sw. U. L. REV.
45, 66-67 (1998); Paul Buchanan & Courtney W. Wiswall, The Evolving Understanding of
Workplace Harassment and Employer Liability: Implications of Recent Supreme Court
Decisions Under Title VII, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 55, 64-65 (1999). This fear has not
been borne out by subsequent cases.
4" See Grossman, supra note 5, at 715-19 (describing possible scenarios and likely
ruling with respect to liability for each).
426 See, e.g., Sherwyn et al., supra note 56, at 1301 (advocating for a rule that would
exonerate employers who behaved responsibly, even though it may result in a victim re-
ceiving no compensation for actionable harassment); Rachel Schacter, Creating Equitable
Outcomes Through Remedies: When Reasonable Employers Must be Held Liable for Sex-
ual Harassment under Title VII, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 567 (2001) (proposing reform
that would alleviate problem of holding employers liable when both employer and victim
behaved reasonably).
427 See supra note 23 (collecting cases).
42X See Grossman, supra note 5, at 717-18.
42 See id. at 718.
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defense, but the second prong as well.1 30 In cases where the employer
behaved responsibly, courts were more likely to find that the victim be-
haved unreasonably. Based on a content analysis of these opinions, the
authors of this study concluded that "[s]uch factors as whether an em-
ployer has a good sexual harassment policy and responds well to an alle-
gation may prove sufficient to satisfy prongs one and two, independent of
what an employee may or may not do.' 43 Thus, plaintiffs in those cases
were found to have acted unreasonably when they delayed even a short
time before reporting the harassment or complained to the wrong party.43
Even if courts were not influenced by employer conduct, liability on
the employer is appropriate for harassment that becomes actionable be-
fore the victim can complain. Because the employer is in a better position
to prevent such acts by screening and monitoring supervisors, it should bear
the risk of loss when those measures fail.
433
Others have praised the affirmative defense for preventing victims
from remaining silent in the face of harassment and then later complain-
ing when nothing was done to help them.4 34 This criticism would be more
convincing if the legal regime were calculated to increase victim report-
ing.4 35 Instead, as discussed above, the regime punishes victims for fail-
ing to report harassment without building in any incentives to increase
the likelihood that they will. 436
Short of eliminating the affirmative defense, there are two smaller
changes that may also improve the likelihood that employers will take
measures that successfully combat the problem of harassment. First, the
standard for punitive damages should be changed. The Supreme Court, in
Kolstad, adopted a good-faith standard, holding that employers should
not face punitive damages if they had made a good-faith effort to comply
with Title VII.4137 Enacting anti-discrimination policies and procedures
were precisely the measures the Court mentioned as constituting "good-
faith." This standard reinforces the problem with the underlying liability
430 See Sherwyn et al., supra note 56, at 1285-86.
431 Id. at 1286.
432 Id. at 1298.
433 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of
the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 607 (1988)
(arguing that strict liability for employers is justified on efficiency grounds); Justin P.
Smith, Note, Letting the Master Answer: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace After Faragher and Burlington Industries, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1786, 1816 (1999);
cf. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional
Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 26 SAN DIEG L. REV. 41, 80-81 (1999) (arguing that
an employer should be held liable when the victim fails to complain about harassment that
could not have been prevented by a complaint).
"'Cf Krieger, supra note 131, at 194-95 (questioning whether evidence that victims
in fact do not report harassment is sufficient to justify a rule that they should not be re-
quired to).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 330-332.
436 See id.
437 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999).
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standard: an employer can be relieved of liability because it made some
effort to prevent or remedy harassment, even if its efforts were so inef-
fective that a serious incident of harassment nonetheless occurred. Punitive
damages, instead, should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, leaving
juries free to punish employers who have perhaps paid mere lip service to
prevention while permitting a culture of harassment to proliferate.
Finally, establishing individual liability, in addition to vicarious li-
ability for employers,"' for harassment under Title V11439 may also target
the underlying problem of harassment more directly than holding em-
ployers vicariously liable. Although the research on deterring harassers is
scant, it is certainly reasonable to hypothesize that the threat of monetary
damages and attorneys' fees may have some impact. Employers ultimately
have the resources, foresight, and power necessary to address the prob-
lem of harassment-tools that individuals do not have. Increasing the
number of individuals and entities who can be held accountable for
problems of harassment, however, can only increase the likelihood of
deterring harassing behavior or compensating victims if it occurs.
Beyond these doctrinal changes, extralegal changes may help as
well,44 particularly with the problem of victims underreporting harass-
ment. Because the existing framework does not contain any incentives to
increase victim reporting, other approaches that target victim behavior
may be necessary. As long as the affirmative defense survives, it is in-
cumbent upon women's and employees' advocates to disseminate greater
information about the responsibilities the affirmative defense imposes on
victims to file prompt complaints about sexual harassment. Potential vic-
tims need to be educated about what constitutes sexual harassment, why
it is wrong and should not happen, and how to respond when it does oc-
cur. Greater education could, at a minimum, improve levels of compen-
sation for victims to the extent they fulfill their obligations imposed by
this new regime.
While the changes proposed in this Article may help reduce work-
place harassment, they will not eliminate it. Perhaps one of the most im-
portant lessons from social science is that law cannot, by itself, change
culture or behavior. While legal incentives have some capacity to produce
43 Cf. Paul S. Greenlaw & Lieutenant William H. Port, Military Versus Civilian Judi-
cial Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases, 1993 LABOR L.J. 368, 373 (1993) (noting that
a military system, which allows individual liability but not entity liability, may not provide
sufficient incentives for military higher-ups to prevent harassment).
131 As discussed above, no federal court has permitted individuals to be held liable un-
der Title VII, although they can be under many state anti-discrimination laws. See supra
note 25 (collecting authorities). Individuals can also be held criminally liable for some
physical harassment and, some have argued, liable in tort for all forms of harassment. See
Margaret Talbot, Men Behaving Badly, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 13, 2002, at 52 (advocating
for redress of same-sex harassment claims in tort rather than anti-discrimination law).
See Sharon A. Lobel, Sexuality at Work: Where Do We Go from Here?, 42 J. VOCA-
TIONAL BEHAV. 136, 146 (1993) (exploring whether it is feasible to eliminate sexuality
from the workplace and whether it would reduce the level of harassment).
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a response, they work less effectively on disaggregated groups like vic-
tims than they do on mobilized, well-advised employers. And they only
work in a meaningful way on employers if the incentives induce effective
responses to combating harassment. It may thus be that advocating for
doctrinal change may reveal the same myopia that effected the creation
of the legal regime in the first instance.4 4" '
That the law has limited power to change the workplace culture in
which harassment thrives is evidenced by many things, including survey
data that show no decrease in the prevalence of unwanted sexual attention
despite more than twenty years of litigation and the development of stronger
and stronger rules of liability. In the context of discrimination law, courts
seem confident in their ability to change workplace culture through the
development of liability rules. Yet, experience with anti-discrimination
laws shows that they sometimes have the effect of simply replacing overt
acts of discrimination with covert ones. And, while those who point out
that the under-enforcement of legal rights creates a background that al-
lows discrimination to occur are surely right, the converse is not neces-
sarily true. The faithful, even strong enforcement of anti-discrimination
laws may be insufficient to change a culture in which sexual harassment
thrives.
441 1 credit George Lovell, University of Washington, for pointing out my legal myopia
in thinking about ways to effectuate real change in the sexual harassment context.
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